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TURISDICnON: 
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(a) which states in pertinent part: 
"As provided and defined by law, an appeal may be taken from the final 
orders and judgments of a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the Court 
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the particular court from 
which the appeal is taken within the time allowed by Rule 4." 
Pursuant to Title II, Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, this 
appeal is taken from the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, Utah to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES : 
This appeal revolves around four central issues: 
1) Whether the Court committed Reversible error by failing to make 
findings to rebut the Uniform Child Support Guidelines as required by U.C.A. 
§ 78-45-7, by failing to follow the Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
absence of findings to rebut the guidelines as required by U.C.A. § 78-45-7, and 
by failing to follow other mandatory requirements of U.C.A. § 78-45 as they 
relate to imputation of income and Plaintiffs responsibility to support the 
parties' minor child; 
2) Whether the evidence supported a finding that the Defendant was 
willfully underemployed and whether the Court abused its discretion by 
failing to make child support retroactive when the trial delay was not the 
fault of the Defendant but the fault of the Court, and by imputing income to 
Defendant based upon the arrearages incurred during the Court-caused delay; 
3) Whether the Court denied the Defendant his Constitutional right of 
equal protection of the law by requiring him to provide for the support of the 
parties' minor child rather than requiring both parties to do so as required by 
U.C.A. § 78-45-3 and U.C.A. § 78-45-4, and by allowing Plaintiff an opportunity 
to complete her education while denying Defendant the same opportunity to 
do so; 
3 
4) Whether the Court practiced law from the bench in violation of the 
Utah State Constitution when he gave legal advice to Plaintiff. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: 
The following statutes are determinative in this appeal: 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 10 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6 (2) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-3 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-4 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 (2) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 (3) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (1) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (2) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (3) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (2) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (3) 
4 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (5) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7)(c) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7)(d)(iii) 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.7 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.14 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
STATEMENT OF NATURE: 
This appeal is from a final decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, Utah, signed and filed June 25,1990, modifying a prior Decree of Divorce. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
1) Plaintiff initiated the original cause of action by filing a complaint for 
divorce on August 24,1987, Civil No. CV 87-1946. Defendant responded by filing a 
complaint for divorce, Civil No. CV 87-2002. The two causes of action were 
consolidated by the Trial Court in October of 1987. 
2) The Defendant was granted a divorce from Plaintiff by a Decree of Divorce 
signed by the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen and entered with the Clerk of the 
Court on November 30, 1988 
3) Trial on the original cause of action was held in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County on Thursday, February 2. 1989, and Monday, February 6,1989, 
and concluded on Thursday, February 9,1989. 
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4) The Trial Court entered a Memorandum Decision with the Clerk of the 
Court on April 25,1989. 
5) Custody determination and property settlement were made, and Plaintiff 
was granted a divorce from Defendant by a Decree of Divorce signed by the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen and entered with the Clerk of the Court on May 
16,1989. 
6) The Defendant petitioned the Court for a Modification of the Divorce 
Decree on September 25,1989, which was heard on June 20,1990. The Court entered 
the order from which this appeal is taken on June 25,1990. 
7) The Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on July 20,1990 with the clerk of the 
trial court. The Defendant then filed a Docketing Statement for this matter with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals on August 9,1990. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: 
This appeal is from a final decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, Utah. 
MATERIAL FACTS: 
The Defendant was divorced from the Plaintiff by a Decree of Divorce signed 
and entered with the Clerk of the Court on November 30,1988. Property settlement 
and custody determination were finalized in a decree signed and entered with the 
6 
Clerk of the Court on May 16,1989. In this decree, Plaintiff was allotted alimony in 
excess of $200 per month. The Defendant was ordered to pay child support of $174, 
as per the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. In conjunction with this second 
decree, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen saw fit to grant Plaintiff a decree of divorce from 
the Defendant in addition to the court's prior divorce order.* 
From the time of the initial filing of the divorce action, the Defendant has 
voluntarily paid all child support and separate maintenance ordered by the court. 
On June 17, 1989, Defendant was laid-off from his job due to organizational 
changes.2 At this time, the defendant became unable to maintain his child support, 
alimony, payments on marital debts, and living expenses.3 In early July of 1989, in 
light of these circumstances, defendant requested Attorney Craig M. Snyder, to 
initiate proceedings for a modification. The defendant vigorously sought 
employment during this time.4 
On July 5,1989, Defendant was offered a temporary full-time position with 
the staff at BYU's Law Library. However, this position would become part time with 
the initiation of the new school year.5 At this time the defendant made the 
1
 Record, page 168, "Decree of Divorce;" and page 218, "Memorandum Decision." 
2
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 5. 
3
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 36, line 24; and page 309, Tables, "Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce." 
4
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 21. 
5 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 19, line 12. 
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determination that it would be necessary to complete his degree, before any career 
advancement could be possible.^ 
Mr. Snyder filed Defendant's Petition for Modification on September 25, 
1989.7 The modification was to be heard by Judge Christensen. This matter was 
docketed for pre-trial or trial hearing on multiple occasions, including the eventual 
hearing on June 20, 1990.8 
Due to Judge Christensen's illness, injuries, and subsequent recuperation, the 
matter was repeatedly postponed. The hearing was further delayed when a pro 
tempore judge refused to hear the case citing the complexity of the issues.9 In the 
interim, Defendant was again involuntarily released from employment, this time 
from the Law Library on April 26,1990.10 Diligent effort was made by Defendant to 
secure employment from that time until the time of the trial.11 On June 20,1989, 
the case was eventually heard by Judge Christensen, who delivered his decision 
6
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 19, line 18. 
7
 Record, page 271, "Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce." 
8 Record, page 328 line 7 through line 20, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 61. (See also: 
page 271, "Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce; " page 292, "Request for Trial Setting;" 
page 297, "Notice of Pre-Trial;" page 298, "Trial Date Scheduled;" page 299, "Minute Entry" by 
Judge Allen B. Sorensen; and page 300, "Trial." 
9 Record, page 299, "Minute Entry" by Judge Allen Sorensen. 
10 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 20, line 9. 
ii Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 36, line 22. 
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from the bench.*2 The written Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, including the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was signed and entered with the Clerk of 
the Court on June 25,1990.13 
Defendant brings this appeal requesting the decision be reversed and 
remanded for rehearing asserting that the trial court's decision reflects manifest 
error, abuse of discretion, and violation of Defendant's Constitutional right to equal 
protection of the law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT: 
Defendant brings this appeal based upon four issues: 1) Reversible Error, 2) 
Abuse of Discretion, 3) Denial of Defendant's Constitutional Rights, and 4) the 
Practice of Law by the Court. 
REVERSIBLE ERROR: 
The Trial Court committed several reversible errors in this case. First and 
foremost, the Court failed to follow or properly enter findings to rebut the 
legislative presumptions found in Utah State Law under Sections 78-45-7 and 7.2. 
Pursuant to this statute, the Court is required to use both parties' financial positions 
in determining a support award pursuant to statute and recent case law, which this 
12
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 56, line 19. 
13 Record, page 311, "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce." 
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Court failed do. Both Parties were unemployed at the time of the trial. Both parties 
had been working from the time of the Petition for Modification until some time 
shortly before the date of the actual hearing. But the Court only used the 
Defendant's (imputed) income in determination of the support award. As such, the 
Court constructively refused to follow the Utah Code. 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 requires the Court to apply the guidelines unless the 
evidence rebuts the presumptions in the statute. The Court, however, by failing to 
find evidence to rebut U.C.A.§78-45-7.2, became subject to U.C.A. § 78-45-7 (3). The 
Court found that there was a matericd change of circumstances, constructively 
rebutted the guidelines but then failed to present specific findings of fact as required 
by the statute. Specifically, the Court failed to address: 
a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
f) the age of the parties; 
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.14 
In several cases on point heard this year, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
such an omission constituted reversible error. First, in Tefferies v. Tefferies, (752 P.2d 
909 (Utah App. 1988)) and then again in Ostler v. Ostler (789 P.2d 713, Utah App. 
14 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7 (3). 
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1990) the Court of Appeals stated that because these factors "constitute material 
issues," that "failure to enter specific findings on each of the factors is generally 
reversible error."15 The Court of Appeals later supported the Ostler Court's decision 
in Durfee (Wolf) v. Durfee (140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. August 9,1990)) 
and again in Allred v. Allred (141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah Ct. App. August 13, 
1990)) by reversing and remanding both cases due to the trial courts' failure to enter 
specific findings on each of the above issues after a material change in circumstances 
had been found.16 
Additionally, the Court committed reversible error by imputing income to 
the Defendant when such imputation is in direct violation of Utah statute. U.C.A. § 
78-45-7.5 (7) (d) states in pertinent part that 
"Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills;"17 
The Court also committed reversible error by failing to follow Utah Statute 
and failing to recognize in any way the Plaintiff's responsibility to support the 
parties' child, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45-4. This is not to the exclusion of the 
Defendant's responsibility under U.C.A. § 78-45-3, but rather to the combination of 
15 Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911; See also Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d, at 715. 
16 See also: Layton v. Layton, 111 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Remanded on lack 
of sufficient findings), Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Similarly remanded 
on lack of sufficient findings), and Johnson v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(Also remanded on lack of sufficient findings). 
17 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7) (d) (iii) 
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responsibility in equal part of the parties. The parties share the responsibility co-
equally, without regard to custody or gender.is The Court is also directed to require 
of both parties employment history and other financial data in determining a just 
award.19 Instead, the Court based its findings solely on the Defendant's imputed 
income, even after being informed by Counsel as to the need for equality in this 
matter.20 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION: 
The Court abused its discretion by finding that the Defendant was willfully 
underemployed. Such a finding, however, is completely unsupported by the 
evidence presented at trial. The only evidence presented at trial was Defendant's 
testimony regarding his search for employment during his two periods of 
unemployment. The Defendant believed that to continue his basic educational 
pursuits was sanctioned by the Court due to the fact that it had openly supported 
Plaintiffs efforts in doing so, and that the original decree made mention of that 
intention and was silent as to any objection to doing so.21 Furthermore, the 
18 Allred v. Mired, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (quoting 98 A.L.R.3d 1146, 1150 (1989)). 
19 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 (5) (b), (1989). Defendant voluntarily 
submitted this information. 
20 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 56, line 5, through 57, line 9. 
21 Record, page 227, paragraph 8, "Memorandum Decision." 
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Defendant testified that he searched diligently for employment both in June of 1989 
and again in Spring of 1990 and no evidence was ever presented to the contrary.22 
The Court also abused its discretion by imputing income based upon its 
erroneous finding that Defendant was willfully underemployed and upon 
arrearages incurred by the Defendant prior to the trial. Had the Court heard the case 
in a timely manner, the arrearages would have been relatively insignificant. 
Indeed, the Defendant would have been only $335 in arrears of Child Support, 
instead of $1,562.89 as claimed by Plaintiff and supported by the Court.23 Public 
policy and due process considerations suggest that the Defendant's case should not 
be jeopardized or in any way prejudiced by actions of the Court or any third party. 
The Court abused its discretion by failing to make its order for modified 
support retroactive to the date of filing of the petition for modification, pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6. The Court's refusal to make the order retroactive is based solely 
upon the erroneous finding that Defendant has not been diligent in paying support 
and is supported in its entirety by the level of arrearages.24 Again, had the 
Defendant been given an opportunity to have his petition heard within a reasonable 
period of time, such arrearages would be negligible. The purpose of the policy of 
retroactivity under the statute is to provide the petitioner with a position as though 
22 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 21, p. 21, line 9, and p. 36, 
line 22. 
23 Record, page 309, "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", Table of support. 
24 Record, page 328,, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 60, line 25,through page 61, line 20 
(See also Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 69, line 9.) 
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the case had been heard upon the filing of the petition, thus removing any bias 
created by the Court's delay, whether or not that delay was reasonable. 
DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
The Court denied Defendant's rights under the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions. First, the Court refused to allow equal educational opportunity to the 
parties. The Court has allowed the Plaintiff to continue her educational pursuits but 
has effectively denied the Defendant's desire to do likewise.25 The Court also 
refused to apply statues equally. U.C.A. § 78-45-3 and § 78-45-4 succinctly declare 
both father and mother to be equally responsible in the support of their children. 
The Court, however, required only the Defendant (father) to provide for his child. 
Even upon recommendation of Counsel to consider Plaintiff's financial potential in 
addition to the Defendant's, the Court refused to consider anything but the 
Defendant's (imputed) income. Such a position is clearly a denial of equal 
protection of the law pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14 Section 1, 
and is therefore reversible error. 
PRACTICE OF LAW FROM THE BENCH: 
Finally, the Court violated the Utah State Constitution by advising and 
encouraging Plaintiff on four separate occasions to submit proper filings in the 
25 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 57, line 2. 
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future regarding reinstatement of alimony.26 The Court went so far as to determine 
what level of alimony would be awarded upon such filing. Such action constitutes 
the practice of law and is contrary to the Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 10. 
CONCLUSION: 
Based, therefore on the manifest, reversible error of the Court, the Court's 
abuse of Discretion, the manifest denial of the Defendant's Constitutional rights, 
and the Court's practice of law from the bench, Defendant prays the Utah Court of 
Appeals to reverse the decision of the Trial Court, and remand the matter back to 
district court for a fair and impartial hearing. 
ARGUMENT: 
Defendant brings this appeal based upon four issues: 1) Reversible Error, 2) 
Abuse of Discretion, 3) Denial of Defendant's Constitutional Rights, and 4) The 
Practice of Law by the Court from the bench. 
26 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 7, line 13, p. 61, line 13, p. 62, line 
10, and p. 63, line 10. 
15 
REVERSIBLE ERROR: 
FAILURE TO FOLLOW OR REBUT CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES. 
The Trial Court committed several reversible errors in this case. First and 
foremost, the Court failed to follow or properly enter findings to rebut the 
legislative presumptions found in Utah State Law under Sections 78-45-7 and 7.2. 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 states in pertinent part: 
"The guidelines apply to any judicial or 
administrative order establishing or modifying an award 
of child support entered on or after July 1,1989."27 
These guidelines provide that a proportionate contribution toward support must be 
made by each parent. In Allred v. Allred, (141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, (Utah Ct. App. 
August 1989).), the Court held that the guidelines must be followed unless the trial 
court found them to be improper. If the trial court finds the guidelines to be 
improper then it is required to make specific findings as to why it did not follow 
them.28 Thus the Court is required to use both parties' financial positions in 
determining a support award. (See U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7 and 7.14) In this case, the trial 
court failed to do so. Both parties had worked until just prior to trial on 
modification. However, the trial court only imputed income to the Defendant and 
27 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (l)(a). 
28 Allred v. Allred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep, at page 16, and footnote 3, page 17. 
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none to the Plaintiff.29 As such, the Court did not follow the guidelines. It was then 
required to make specific findings which it did not do. 
U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 requires the Court to apply the guidelines unless rebutted. 
It states: 
"a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the 
amount of temporary or permanent child support. 
"b) the rebuttable presumption means the provisions and 
considerations required by the guidelines and the award 
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines 
are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. "30 
When a court fails to follow the guidelines, it becomes subject to U.C.A. § 78-
45-7 which states: 
"Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior court order unless there has been a 
material change of circumstance on the part of the obligor 
or obligee. "31 
It further states: 
"If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the 
guidelines, the court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors including but not limited 
to: 
a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
29
 Record, page 306, lines 13 through 22, "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
30 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) and (b). 
31 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7 (1). 
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b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
f) the age of the parties; 
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.32 
The Court found that there was a material change of circumstance, did not follow 
the guidelines, and failed to make findings of fact as required by the statute when it 
chose to disregard the guidelines. For example, it did not make findings as to the: 
a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
b) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
c) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
d) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
e) the age of the parties. 
In several cases on point, the Utah Court of Appeals held that such an 
omission constituted reversible error. In Tefferies v. Tefferies (752 P.2d 909 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988)), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the above factors "constitute 
material issues upon which the trial court must enter findings of fact."33 The 
32 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7 (3). 
33
 Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911. 
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Tefferies Court went on to state that "the failure to enter specific findings on each of 
the factors is generally reversible error. "34 
In Ostler v. Ostler (789 P.2d 713, (Utah App. 1990)) the Utah Court of Appeals 
found again that failure to enter specific findings on each of the elements of U.C.A. § 
78-45-7 constituted reversible error.35 in the Ostler case, the factual pattern differed 
from the present case only in that the material change of circumstances was 
stipulated to instead of made by a finding of the Court. Additionally, the father's 
income was found to have increased instead of decreased as in the instant case. 
In all other aspects Ostler and Tefferies were similar factually as the instant 
case. In Ostler, the trial court had made findings regarding the changes in income 
which were more specific than the findings in the instant case. The Ostler Court 
found that even with more specific findings, the findings of the trial court were still 
too ambiguous to be useful.36 The net result was that the Ostler trial court had made 
an award but it did not fit the guidelines as specified in U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7 and 7.14, 
and the guidelines were thus not rebutted as permitted by U.C.A. § 78-45-7 (3). The 
Ostler court stated: 
"While the trial court made findings of fact, we cannot 
determine to what extent these factors were applied."37 
34 Id. 
35 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715, (quoting Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911). 
36 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715. 
37 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715. 
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In the instant case, however, no findings of fact are made with regard to any of the 
required factors. 
The Court of Appeals later cited the Ostler Court's decision in Durfee (Wolf) 
v. Durfee (140 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (August 9,1990)). The Appellant's counterpetition 
was denied on every point except for the court's failure to enter specific findings 
regarding these issues. The Durfee Court cited Ostler: 
" 'The [trial court's] apportionment of financial 
responsibility between the parties will not be upset on 
appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary or we determine that the court has abused its 
discretion.' 38 We find that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to enter sufficient findings of fact to 
support the child support awarded." 39 
The Utah Court of Appeals again approved the Ostler decision in Allred v. 
AUred (141 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (August 13, 1990).) when it overturned the trial 
court's child support award based upon the trial court's failure to present findings 
on the seven factors. The Allred Court noted that the trial judge had actually made 
findings regarding some of the required factors, but that because the findings were 
incomplete, "the findings as a whole [were] insufficient. "40 
38 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715 (citations omitted). 
39 Durfee (Wolf) v. Durfee, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43. 
40 Allred v. Allred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep., at page 5. 
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The Allred Court was specific with regard to explaining how apportionment 
of responsibility is to take place. Quoting 98 A.L.R.3d 1146,1150 (1980), the Allred 
Court noted: 
"The trend of the law today is 'toward equal rights 
and responsibilities for women...requiring that the wife 
contribute child support if she is financially able in an 
amount approximately proportional to her financial 
ability.' (Propriety of Decree in Proceeding Between 
Divorce Parents to Determine Mother's Duty to Pay 
Support for Children in Custody of Father). Although 
apparently never addressing this precise issue before, Utah 
appellate courts have recognized that 'both parents have 
an obligation to support their children.' Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
This notion of equal responsibility is also apparent as a 
matter of statutory law in Utah. (U.C.A. § 78-45-3, -4. Utah 
statues draw no distinction in terms of support duty 
between custodial and non-custodial parents nor between 
fathers and mothers. The duty of both is the same."41 
The Allred Court went on to say that U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7 (1990) required the 
same analysis as set out in 98 A.L.R.3d. 1146,1150 (1980). 
The status of the law, therefore, is quite clear. Failure to present specific 
findings regarding : 
a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
41 Allred v. Allred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep., note #3, at 17. 
21 
c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
f) the age of the parties; 
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others, 
constitutes reversible error.42 
IMPROPER IMPUTATION OF INCOME. 
The Court committed reversible error by imputing income to the Defendant 
when such imputation is in direct violation of Utah statute. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5 (7) 
(d) states in pertinent part that: 
"Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training 
to establish basic job skills;1'43 
The Plaintiff is pursuing basic college level education. Likewise, the 
Defendant desires to do the same. Both parties are attempting to develop basic 
occupational training to establish basic skills in their area according to their desires 
and abilities. The purpose of the provision to restrain the court from imputing 
income is simply to afford individuals the opportunity to better their position so as 
to more adequately support their families and children and not be a burden on 
42 Allred v. Alfred, 141 Utah Adv. Rep., at 15. 
43 Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (7) (d) (iii) 
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society. But the Court in this case did not recognize this fact. It either had to impute 
income to both or to neither. 
FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE LAW: 
The Court also committed reversible error by failing to recognize in any way 
that the Plaintiff has a responsibility to support the parties' child as well as 
Defendant. (See U.C.A. § 78-45-4) This is not to the exclusion of the Defendant's 
responsibility under U.C.A. § 78-45-3, but rather is in addition to Defendant's 
responsibility. The Court must require of both parties evidence of employment 
history and other financial data before making a just award.44 Instead, the Court 
based its findings solely on the Defendant's imputed income, even after being 
informed by Counsel as to the need for equality in this matter.4^ 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION: 
IMPROPER FINDING OF WILLFUL UNDEREMPLOYMENT: 
The Court abused its discretion by finding that the Defendant was willfully 
underemployed and/or unemployed. Such a finding is completely unsupported by 
the evidence presented at trial. The only evidence presented at trial was 
44 Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 (5) (b), (1989). 
45 Record, page 328, 'Transcript of Hearing," p. 56, line 5 , through p. 57, line 9. 
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Defendant's testimony regarding his search for employment during his two periods 
of unemployment. In direct examination regarding the first period of 
unemployment, the Defendant was asked: 
"After, following June 17th of 1989, how long was it 
before you obtained other employment?" 
The Defendant responded: 
"[It] would have been about three weeks. I looked 
first for full time employment, could not find any, and so 
was hired-on part-time at the BYU Law Library, though I 
was allowed to work extra hours for the first couple of 
months."46 
In further direct examination, this time regarding the second period of 
unemployment, the Defendant was asked: 
"Now, following April the 27th of 1990, what have 
you done with regard to employment and your 
schooling?" 
To which the Defendant responded: 
"...since then, not having been employed, I have been in 
school full time, still I have been, during the off hours, 
looking for part-time employment, preferably at BYU so I 
can maintain close proximity to job and work, or work 
and school rather, so that I can facilitate going to classes 
and the like."47 
In cross examination, the Defendant was also asked: 
"What or when was the last time you looked for 
work?" 
46 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 19. 
47 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 21, line 1. (Emphasis added) 
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The Defendant answered: 
"It would have been last Friday. I went into the 
[campus] employment office and then, well, in fact last 
night I talked to a friend of mine who is a contractor, and I 
called him to see if he had any additional work that he 
needed. 
Counsel then asked: 
"What type of work are you looking for, Mr. 
Pickard?" 
The Defendant answered: 
"Right now, I'm looking for something preferably 
with a construction emphasis, though I am not limiting it 
to that, simply because I need some hands-on experience 
in my field."48 
The Defendant therefore made two references to the fact that he was not limiting his 
search to include only BYU employment and testified to the fact that he had made at 
least one successful contact outside BYU within the past week. The trial judge, 
however, disregarded this fact, interpreting the testimony to reflect upon 
Defendant's efforts as a whole. The Defendant, however, at no time suggested that 
he was unwilling to work or to find suitable employment. 
Furthermore, the Court, in its original decision, acknowledged the fact that 
Plaintiff was enrolled in college at Utah Valley Community College and expected to 
complete her degree in the Spring of 1990. Evidence showed that the State of Utah 
48
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 36, line 22 to p. 37, line 6. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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had funded Plaintiffs education,^ beginning in 1983 until 1989 in an amount 
exceeding $17,000.00.50 In 1989, the Court found that Defendant intended to pursue 
the final portion of his educational however, the Court did not address whether it 
was proper or improper for Defendant to continue his education, while apparently 
approving Plaintiffs educational pursuits. 
The Defendant testified that he searched diligently for employment both in 
and outside of BYU's employment office, and that though he preferred to work in 
the construction (or related) industry, he was not limiting his search to construction 
alone.5^ He testified that in June of 1989 and again in Spring of 1990 the job market 
was tight and that no significant offers had been made and that he did his best to 
find adequate employment and continue paying support, and no evidence to the 
contrary was presented.53 Defendant testified that upon obtaining subsequent 
49 Record, page 321, "Defendant's Exhibit No. 18." 
50
 Record, page 227, "Memorandum Decision." 
51 Record, page 227, paragraph 8, "Memorandum Decision," p. 10. 
52 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 37, line 2. 
53 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 18, line 21; p. 21, line 9; and p. 36, 
line 22. 
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employment, Defendant was willing but unable to comply completely with the 
support order due to his greatly reduced earnings and capability to pay.54 
There was no evidence to support the position of willful unemployment or 
that to temporarily limit work in order to better one's position is out of line with 
what the Court and the State of Utah had actively encouraged Plaintiff to do. 
IMPROPER IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO DEFENDANT: 
The Court also abused its discretion by imputing income based upon its 
erroneous finding that Defendant was willfully underemployed and upon 
arrearages incurred by the Defendant prior to the trial. Had the Court heard the case 
in a timely manner, the arrearages would have been relatively insignificant. 
Indeed, the Defendant would have been only $335 in arrears of Child Support, 
instead of $1,562.89 as claimed by Plaintiff and supported by the Court.55 
The Court, however, placed great emphasis on the fact that Defendant had 
become $1,600 behind in his payments. The Court stated: 
"I have concern about looking at your schedule. 
This man has paid very little over the period of time 
[since June, 1989]."56 
54 See generally, Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 17 - 25, and p. 38, line 
13 to p. 40, line 10.. 
55 Record, page 309,"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", Table of support. 
56 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p.61, line 1. 
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Imputation of income, however, is not allowed. As noted above, U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5 
(d)(iii) prohibits imputation of income when a parent is engaged in basic 
occupational training. Both parties have received equivalent levels of education 
and have both been gainfully employed.57 
The argument could be pursued that skills obtained in a college setting may 
be beyond the scope of this statute. The statute, however, specifically allows for both 
career and occupational training to establish basic skills of onefs chosen occupation. 
Furthermore, the Court has allowed Plaintiff to continue her college education, 
presumably on the basis that she is obtaining a basic college education to better her 
position. For the Court to now determine that Defendant is not allowed to do the 
same is simply unjust and violates the equal protection clause of the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions. 
Public policy and due process considerations suggest that the Defendant's case 
should not be jeopardized or in any way prejudiced by delay of the Court and that 
interpretation and application of the law must be evenhanded.58 
57 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 58, line 7. 
58
 U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1, which is also applicable to the states via 
case law, and Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7. 
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FAILURE TO MAKE MODIFIED ORDER RETROACTIVE: 
U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6 states in pertinent part: 
MA child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any period 
during which a petition for modification is pending, but 
only from the date notice of that petition was given to the 
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner."^ 
No case has squarely addressed this issue to date, though it is reasonable to believe 
that the statute is intended for cases such as the instant case as follows: 
Defendant filed the Petition for Modification on September 25,1989. Due to 
the illness, injury and necessary recuperation of Judge Cullen Y. Christensen, the 
pre-trial conference was not scheduled until March of 1990.60 During this time, the 
Defendant found his financial situation deteriorating to the point that, although 
barely able to pay for minimal immediate living expenses, he was unable to meet 
any other obligations, thus also temporarily unable to meet the support order.61 
Judge Christensen's recuperation prevented his attendance at the subsequent 
hearing set for March 30,1990, nor was he able to attend the trial scheduled for May 
10,1990, at which time Judge Sorensen, temporarily assigned to hear Judge 
Christensen's cases, refused to hear the case due to it's complexity. The eventual 
59 U .C.A. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1989) 
60 Record, page 288, "Notice of Pre-Trial Settlement Hearing." 
61 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 38, line 25 through p. 39, line 8. 
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trial date was set for June 20,1990, a full nine (9) months from the date of the 
original petition, and more than a year from the actual change in circumstances. 
The Court remarked: 
"I understand that, Mr. Snyder, you filed [the petition] in 
August of 1989 or thereeibouts. The Court's finding is, 
however, he has not applied himself as well as he might. 
And now to come in and ask the Court to relieve him of 
that obligation with that position, the Court is not 
inclined to do so. I'm not going to make it retroactive."62 
Had the Defendant been granted trial within a reasonable time, the arrearages 
claimed by Plaintiff would have been insignificant. The delay alone, unduly 
prejudiced the Defendant's position.^ The Court's refusal to make the order 
retroactive is based solely upon the erroneous finding that Defendant has not been 
diligent in paying support and is supported in its entirety by the level of arrearages.64 
Certainly, it is not fitting to assess any party with the entire impact of the court's 
delay, whether or not the court held in that party's favor. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the doctrine of retroactivity under the U.C.A. § 
30-3-10.6 is precisely to provide the petitioner with a position of no delay, as though 
the case had been heard upon the filing of the petition, thus removing any bias 
created by the delay. To support denial of the doctrine of retroactivity with a finding 
based upon the effects of the delay seems nonsensical. The Court held that, indeed, 
62 Record, page 328, "Transcript of hearing," p. 61, line 11. 
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 See Supra, note 51. 
64 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," pp. 60, line 25, through 61, line 20. 
(See also Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 69, line 9.) 
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a material change of circumstances had occurred, ostensibly due to Defendant's 
unemployment. The Court held, however, that regardless of Defendant's inability 
to pay, Defendant would be held to the original support ordered; this conclusion 
being based in significant part upon the amount of support remaining unpaid. The 
faulty circular logic becomes apparent. 
DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 14, SECTION 1: 
Finally, the Court denied Defendant's rights under the Utah and the United 
States Constitutions. First, the Court refused to grant equal protection or 
opportunity to the parties. The Court has allowed the Plaintiff to continue her 
educational pursuits but has effectively denied the Defendant's request to do 
likewise.65 
During the oral decision, the Court commented: 
"I think the decision to go to school, while a 
laudable one, under some circumstances may be very 
good. But when one has the obligation to support, as does 
Mr. Pickard, I don't think you are in a position to make 
those decisions or put yourself in a position, even though 
ultimately you hope to gain a situation where you may be 
better off financially and able to pay a greater amount."66 
Counsel for Defendant then reminded the Court that Defendant testified in the 
original trial that he had quit school to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to continue 
65 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 57, line 2. 
66 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 57, line 3. 
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her education, that Defendant had intended to complete his schooling and that both 
parties had been employed for the duration of the marriage. Counsel then made 
reference to Utah law by stating: 
"...I think it is significant that that testimony was 
offered then and that Mrs. Pickard, if anything, has the 
same kind of duty of support and earnings. And if she is 
in fact cured of her emotional disturbances, she has a duty, 
the same type of duty to be going out and earning support. 
She has been continuing her education as well."67 
The Court responded: 
"I'm aware of that situation, Mr. Snyder, and 
recognize that health circumstances often change plans of 
many people. But the fact remains that this man has a 
child, has some abilities, he isn't incapable of, he has not 
physical infirmities, he has good skills, he has some ability 
to earn and ability to work if you will. Lots of people go to 
school and work full time to assume their 
responsibilities."^ 
The Court could have made the same statement about the Plaintiff. In this 
statement, the Court refused to consider both parties' responsibility to support the 
parties' child. Quoting 98 A.L.R. 1146 and by citing Utah law, the Allred Court, 
however, declared that responsibility for support must be held co-equal by both 
parents.69 
Thus, in spite of the fact that U.C.A. § 78-45-3 and § 78-45-4 clearly and 
succinctly declares both father and mother to be equally responsible in the support of 
67 Id, p.59, line 3. 
68 Id, at line 10. 
69 See Supra, note 30. 
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their children, the Court required only the Defendant (father) to provide for his 
child. Such a position is clearly a violation of the equal protection clause, in 
opposition to public policy set out in U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6, and thus reversible error. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 10: 
Additionally, the Court violated the Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 10, by encouraging Plaintiff on four separate occasions to submit proper 
filings in the future regarding reinstatement of alimony. First, as opening remarks 
began, Mr. Butterfield attempted to have the issue of reinstatement of alimony 
subsequent to an alleged annulment of the Plaintiffs re-marriage heard by the Court. 
Counsel for Defendant objected, stating that it was not reserved in the pre-trial order 
and that Counsel for Plaintiff had represented to the Court and to Counsel that no 
such claim would be made.70 The Court sustained the objection, and then 
encouraged Plaintiff to pursue the issue by saying: 
"I'm not precluding you however from raising that 
issue in some subsequent proceedings." 
Counsel for Plaintiff responded: 
"That's okay with us!"7i 
70
 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 6, line 5. 
71 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p. 7, line 13. 
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The Court again recommended Plaintiff take future action by indicating the 
amount the Court would order as alimony in the event of such future consideration 
and that it would make such alimony retroactive to the date of her remarriage.72 
The Court then advised Counsel that the issue might be brought before the Court 
"by memorandum or appropriate filings." Finally, the Court reaffirmed its 
assessment of $100 per month upon proof that the annulment did, in fact, exist.73 
Certainly this kind of advice is unnecessary for an accomplished attorney 
such as Mr. Butterfield, Counsel for Plaintiff. Mr. Butterfield has been a member of 
the Bar for some time and has gained substantial experience and knowledge as to 
how to bring a matter before the court. Therefore, the advice relayed to Counsel 
regarding the necessity and method of future filings is highly improper conduct for 
any judge, as such action constitutes the practice of law. 
"Supreme court justices, district court judges, and 
judges of all other courts of record while holding office 
may not practice law..." Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 10. 
72 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p.61, line 17. 
73 Record, page 328, "Transcript of Hearing," p.63, lines 10 through 21. 
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CONCLUSION: 
Based, therefore on the manifest, reversible error of the Court, the Court's 
abuse of Discretion, the manifest denial of the Defendant's Constitutional rights, 
and the unlawful practice of law by this Court, Defendant prays the Utah Court of 
Appeals to overturn the decision of the Trial Court, and remand the matter back to 
district court for a fair and impartial hearing. 
DATED tms day of , 1990. 
Keith F. Pickard, pro se 
Defendant and Appellant. 
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was before him, rather than invoking the 
doctrine of res judicata. Rule 65B(iX2) is 
designed to prevent successive petitions for 
a writ based on identical grounds, a poten-
tial abuse of the judicial system.1 The rule 
provides that a court should dismiss a peti-
tion if "it is apparent . . . that the legality 
or constitutionality of [the petitioner's] con-
finement has already been adjudged in [pri-
or habeas corpus or other similar] proceed-
ings." 
This Court recently construed rule 
65B(iX2) in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 
(Utah 1989): 
A ground for relief from a conviction or 
sentence that has once been fully and 
fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior 
habeas proceeding should not be readju-
dicated unless it can be shown that there 
are "unusual circumstances." For exam-
ple, a prior adjudication is not a bar to 
reexamination of a conviction if there has 
been a retroactive change in the law, see 
generally Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 
81 (Utah 1983); a subsequent discovery 
of suppressed evidence, see Gallegos v. 
Turner, 17 Utah 2d 273, 409 P.2d 386 
(1965), or newly discovered evidence, see 
State v. Lafferty, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 
1989). But ordinarily, a ground for set-
ting aside a conviction or sentence may 
not be relitigated. 
Id. at 1036. The list of "unusual circum-
stances" in Hurst is not exhaustive, but 
this case would not fall into any extension 
of that category. The double jeopardy 
claim presented to Judge Rokich in the rule 
1. Rule 65B(iX2) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) . . . The complaint shall further slate 
that the legality or constitutionality of his 
commitment or confinement has not already 
been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus or 
other similar proceeding; and if the com-
plainant shall have instituted prior similar 
proceedings in any court, state or federal, 
within the state of Utah, he shall so state in 
his complaint, shall attach a copy of any 
pleading filed in such court by him to his 
complaint, and shall set forth the reasons for 
the denial of relief in such other court, in 
such case, if it is apparent to the court in 
which the proceeding under this rule is insti 
tuied that the legality or constitutionality of 
his confinement has already been adjudged in 
such pi lor proceedings, the tourt shall forth-
65B(i) petition was exactly the same as uv 
one denied by Judge Daniels in CandeUr-
io's first habeas corpus petition.2 JUAV 
Rokich's dismissal was therefore correct 
although his reliance on res judicata wa« 
unnecessary; he could simply have declined 
reconsideration of the double jeopardy 
claim under rule 65B(i)(2). The result 
would have been the same if Judge Rokich 
had denied the writ under rule 65B(i)(2) 
however, and his reliance instead on the 
doctrine of res judicata did not affect Can 
delario's rights. 
[3 J Judge Rokich's dismissal of Cande-
lario's due process claim was also appropri-
ate. Candelario argues that he did not 
receive notice of the second hearing on an 
order to show cause. However, he did not 
raise this argument at the second probation 
revocation hearing or in his first habeas 
petition before Judge Daniels. Candelario 
first raised the issue of lack of notice in his 
petition before Judge Rokich. Prior adjudi-
cation of a habeas petition does not auto-
matically bar the adjudication of a subse-
quent petition raising new grounds for re-
lief. See Johns v. Shulsen, 784 P.2d 1151 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam); Hurst, 111 P2d 
at 1037. However, rule 65B(iX4) requires 
that a petitioner show good cause for not 
raising all complaints of denial of constitu-
tional rights in the first postconviction pro-
ceeding in order to justify consideration of 
a subsequent petition.3 Candelario has 
shown no reason why he did not raise the 
issue of lack of notice at the second revoca-
tion hearing or in his first habeas petition. 
with dismiss such complaint, giving written 
notice thereof by mail to the complainant, 
and no further proceedings shall be had on 
such complaint. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 65B0X2). 
2. Candelario would have been entitled to app^ 
late review of his double jeopardy claim » 
had appealed from Judge Daniels' order. 
3. Rule 65B(i)(4) provides: 
(4) All claims of the denial of any oi c " ^ 
plainant's constitutional rights shall **!*lon 
in the postconviction proceeding broug 
der thi* rule and may not be laised in *fw 
subsequent proceeding except for g** 
shown therein. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(i)(4). 
OSTLER v. 
Cite as 789 P2d 713 
and he has shown no good cause for reliev-
ing him of his waiver in this case. 
Judge Rokich's dismissal of the petition 
jg affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
HALL, CJ. , concurs in the results 
OSTLER Utah 7 1 3 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
Affirmed in part, vacated and remand-
ed in part. 
(o fKEYNUMMKSYSHM> 
Margieann W. OSTLER (Wyatt), and 
the State of Utah, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Raymond Floyd OSTLER, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 880172-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 20, 1990. 
Former wife filed petition for modifica-
tion of divorce decree. Parties stipulated 
that there was a substantial change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to provide a basis for 
modification of the decree. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, David S. 




 Per month per child to $200 per 
month per child, declined to distribute for-
mer
 husband's retirement account, but 
awarded wife $250 in attorney fees. Wife 
*>uKht review. The Court of Appeals, 
^
n c h , J., held that: (1) trial court's failure 
f make specific findings on statutory 
J ^ r s constituted reversible error, (2) 
e a rticulated no change of circumstanc-
p r o J U S t l f y i n g a r e e v a l u a t ' ° n of original 
^ Petty division with regards to husband's 
U^t™ 6 1 1 1 account; and (3) wife was enti-
u> an award of attorney fees incurred 
n aPpeal. 
1. Divorce «=>309.1 
Trial courts have continuing jurisdic-
tion to make reasonable and necessary 
changes in child support awards, taking 
into account not only the needs of the chil 
dren, but also the ability of the parent U 
pay. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3). 
2. Divorce <3=»309.2(2) 
A party seeking modification of a chik 
support award must show that a substan-
tial change of circumstances has occurred 
since the divorce decree, not contemplated 
within the decree itself. 
3. Divorce <S=»312.6<1) 
Once the trial court has made a deter-
mination on modification of a child support 
award, the Court of Appeals accords its 
ruling substantial deference. 
4. Divorce <s=»286(3, 6) 
The apportionment of financial respon-
sibility in a divorce proceeding will not be 
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or the Court 
of Appeals determines that the trial court 
has abused its discretion. 
5. Divorce ®^312.6(8) 
The failure of trial court to enter spe-
cific findings on each of the statutory 
factors for an award of prospective support 
after a material change of circumstances is 
generally reversible error, particularly 
where the trial court orders a party to pay 
support to a child beyond the age of majori-
ty. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(2) (now (3)). 
6. Divorce «=>312.6(8) 
Trial court's failure to make specific 
findings as to each of the relevant statu-
tory factors in proceeding to modify child 
support, in which support was increased, 
was reversible error, even though trial 
court's findings noted a "dramatic" in-
crease in husband's income and a "substan-
tial" decline in wife's health. U.C.A.1953, 
78-45-7(2) (now (3)). 
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7. Divorce e=>286(6) 
Trial court's finding, on former wife's 
petition for modification of divorce decree, 
that former husband's retirement account 
was not vested at time of decree, and that 
value of account at vesting was "sufficient 
ly nominal" such that child support pay 
ments made by husband in excess of legal 
obligation more than compensated wife for 
value of account, was appropriately de-
scribed as a conclusion of law, and given no 
particular deference on review, even 
though trial court described its reasoning 
as a "finding of fac t" 
8 Divorce <s=»254(2) 
Former wife was not entitled to por 
tion of former husband's retirement ac 
count, on former wife's petition for modifi 
cation of divorce decree, wife did not re-
ceive portion in initial decree, and wife's 
claim of lack of knowledge of retirement 
benefits did not constitute a change of cir 
cumstances justifying reevaluation of ongi 
nal division 
9 Divorce «=>288 
Former wife was entitled to award of 
attorney fees reasonably incurred on ap-
peal of her petition for modification of di 
vorce decree, where wife partially pre-
vailed, and wife was in need of the assist 
ance U C A 1953, 30-3-3 
Penny Heal Trask, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants 
Harold R Stephens, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent 




Appellant appeals from an order entered 
in district court modifying a decree of di 
vorce We affirm the order in part, vacate 
the order m part and remand 
Appellant Margieann Ostler and respon 
tit nt Kivmond Hoyd Ostltr were divorced 
ir l*r* i t u r tn e ight tenytar marriage 
Hit ik t r t t D1 divorce awarded appellant 
child support in the amount of $75 per 
month for each of the four children in her 
custody The decree also provided for visi 
tation rights, alimony, life and health msur 
ance, attorney fees, and distribution of real 
property, personal property, and debts 
There was no provision for the distribution 
of respondent's retirement account 
In 1987, appellant filed a petition for 
modification of the divorce decree Al 
though respondent had voluntarily in 
creased the amount of his child support 
payments from $75 to $110 per month per 
child, appellant sought to increase child 
support to $230 per month for each of the 
three remaining minor children She also 
sought to distribute respondent's retire-
ment account, and to receive her attorney 
fees and costs As a basis for modification 
of the decree, appellant stated that she was 
unemployed, on public assistance, and that 
she was unable to obtain employment due 
to a speech disability She also alleged 
that respondent had remarried and that his 
income had increased substantially 
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition 
on the grounds that appellant had failed to 
include the State of Utah as the real party 
in interest Respondent claimed that the 
State was providing appellant with finan 
cial assistance and that the State was also 
assigned appellant's right to receive child 
support payments See Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-45-9(2) (1987) The court subsequent 
ly granted appellant's motion to amend her 
petition to join the State of Utah as co-
plaintiff 
A hearing on the petition was conducted 
on December 16, 1987 Counsel for the 
State appeared and stated that respondent 
was current in his support obligation and 
indicated that the State s interest was satis 
fied as long as respondent continued u> 
provide at least the existing level of ^up-
port Counsel was then excused 
The parties stipulated that there was * 
substantial change of circumstances suf > 
cient to provide a basis for modification o 
the decree The hearing proceeded o\ 
proffer The district court subsequent 
issued a memorandum decision modify*11* 
OSTLER v OSTLER 
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the amount of support from $75 per month 
per child to $200 per month per child It 
remains unclear whether this award was 
premised on the support of three children 
or two children' The court declined to 
distribute respondent's retirement account, 
but awarded appellant $250 in attorney 
fees Appellant now seeks review of the 
amount of child support and the denial of 
retirement benefits She also requests an 
award of attorney fees on appeal 
CHILD SUPPORT 
[1-4] Trial courts have continuing juris 
diction to make reasonable and necessary 
changes in child support awards, taking 
into account "not only the needs of the 
children, but also the ability of the parent 
to pay" Woodward v Woodward, 709 
P2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), 
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(3) (1989) A par 
ty seeking modification of a child support 
award must show that a substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred since the 
divorce decree, not contemplated within the 
decree itself Woodward, 709 P 2d at 394 
Once the trial court has made a determina 
tion on modification, we accord its ruling 
substantial deference Id, Proctor v 
Proctor, 773 P 2d 1389, 1390 (Utah Ct App 
1989) The apportionment of financial re 
sponsibility between the parties will not be 
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or we deter 
mine that the court has abused its discre 
ton Woodward, 709 P 2d at 394, Chris 
tensen v Chnstensen, 628 P 2d 1297, 1299 
Wtah 1981), Proctor, 773 P 2d at 390, 
Maughan v Maughan, 770 P2d 156, 161 
(Utah Ct App 1989) However, an award of 
child support may be "so inordinately low" 
4 8
 to constitute an abuse of discretion 
Martinez v Martinez, 754 P 2d 69, 73 
<Utah Ct App 1988), cert granted, 765 P 2d 
l 2?7 (1988) 
*he parties in this case stipulated that 
had been a substantial change of there 
lr<-umstances since the original decree 
e
 stipulation leaves for resolution wheth 
r
 the district court abused its discretion in 
ne of the three minors was nearly eighteen 
1
 'he imit of ihe modilnation lieaung theie 
modifying the original support award from 
$75 to $200 per month per child 
151 In awarding prospective support af 
ter a material change of circumstances, the 
relevant factors to be considered include 
(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties, 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties, 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn, 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn, 
(e) the need of the obligee, 
(0 the age of the parties, 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others 
Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7(2) (1987), Mar 
tinez, 754 P 2d at 73 n 3 Because these 
factors "constitute material issues upon 
which the trial court must enter findings of 
fact," Jeffeneb v Jeffenes, 752 P 2d 909, 
911 (Utah Ct App 1988), the failure to enter 
specific findings on each of the factors is 
generally reversible error, particularly 
where the court orders a party to pay sup-
port to a child beyond the age of majority 
Id at 911-12 
[6] While the trial court made findings 
of fact, we cannot determine to what ex 
tent these factors were applied The find 
mgs merely note a * dramatic' increase in 
respondent's income and a "substantial" 
decline in appellant s health, and set the 
award at $200 per month per child The 
lack of specificity in the findings is further 
compounded by the court s award of sup-
port until each child graduates from high 
school' regardless of age We conclude 
that the failure of the trial court to make 
specific findings on the statutory factors 
constitutes reversible error 
Since the case must be remanded for 
entry of more specific findings, we merely 
note the apparent inadequacy in the 
amount of child support awarded Statu 
tory guidelines now establish base amounts 
of child support See Utah Code Ann 
§ 78-45-7 14 (Supp 1989) Although not in 
effect at the time of the trial court's modi 
fication order see Utah Code Ann 
fore only iwo children of the marriage are now 
below the age o( majority 
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§ 78-45-7 2(lMa) (Supp 1989), these guide 
lines are useful in determining the adequa 
cy of support Appellant argues that the 
disparity between the statutory guidelines 
and the trial courts award constitutes an 
abuse of discretion We are not prepared 
to go quite so far in the absence of specific 
findings, but the financial declarations of 
appellant and respondent contained in the 
record indicate gross monthly incomes of 
$828 and $4,372, respectively Cf Mar 
tinez, 764 P 2d at 73 (abuse of discretion 
shown in award of $300 per month per 
child, where incomes were $1,033 and 
$8,333, respectively) Appellant is func-
tionally handicapped, on welfare, and re-
ceiving food stamps These facts connote 
such a sharp contrast in living standards 
between the parties that $200 per month 
per child appears to be inadequate, and 
thus may constitute an abuse of the court's 
discretion 
"Child support awards should approxi 
mate actual need and, when possible, as 
sure the children a standard of hvmg com 
parable to that which they would have ex 
penenced if no divorce had occurred " Pe 
terson v Peterson, 748 P 2d 593, 596 (Utah 
Ct App 1988) Furthermore, it is public 
policy m this state that "children shall be 
maintained from the resources of respon 
sible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, 
at least in part, the burden often borne by 
the general citizenry through welfare pro-
grams " Utah Code Ann § 78-45b-l 1 
(1987) Since we must vacate the order 
and remand for entry of more specific find 
ings, the award of support should either be 
justified under these objectives, or modified 
consistent with the statutory guidelines 
now m effect2 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT 
DISTRIBUTION 
As part of appellant's petition for modifi 
cation, she claimed that respondent's retire-
ment account was undistributed at the time 
of the divorce and should now be so distrib-
uted Appellant concedes that the decree 
2 The statutory guidelines may be applied to 
child suppoit orders existing prior (o July 1 
WiW «s i< nju, us the guidelines do not form the 
makes no mention of the retirement ac 
count, but argues that she was not aware 
of it at the time of the divorce The dis 
tnct court refused to modify the divorce 
decree to distribute the retirement account 
on the grounds that it was not vested at 
the time of the decree The court also 
found that the value of the account at 
vesting was "sufficiently nominal" such 
that child support payments made by re-
spondent in excess of his legal obligation 
more than compensated appellant for the 
value of the account 
[7] Although the trial court described 
its reasoning as a "finding of fact,' it is 
more appropriately described as a conclu 
sion of law See State ex rel Dxv of 
Consumer Protection v Rio Vista Oil, 
Ltd, 786 P2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1990) (Api 
pellate court will disregard the label of 
"findings of fact" and look to the sub-
stance) We accord a trial court's legal 
conclusions no particular deference on ap-
peal, but review them for correctness 
IFG Leasing Co v Gordon, 776 P 2d 607 
611 (Utah 1989) Without addressing the 
correctness of the district court's rationale 
we may still affirm the result "on any 
proper ground(s), despite the trial court's 
having assigned another reason for its rul 
mg " Buehner Block Co v UWC Assocs 
752 P2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) 
[8] Shortly after the district court ren 
dered its decision, this court addressed a 
similar issue in Throckmorton v Throck 
morton, 767 P 2d 121 (Utah Ct App WW 
Mrs Throckmorton sought to modify a 
1976 divorce decree, silent as to Mr 
Throckmorton's retirement benefits, to ob-
tain one-half of those benefits The trial 
court determined that Mrs Throckmorton 
had the opportunity to litigate the issue at 
the time of the divorce, and since she failed 
to do so, the claim was barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata 
Our opinion noted that res judicata »s 
unique in divorce actions because of the 
equitable doctrine which allows courts to 
basis of a material change ot circumstance 
Utah Code Ann § 78-45 7 2(l)(b) (Supp I 9 8 9 ' 
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reopen alimony, support, or property distn 
butions if the moving party can demon 
strate a substantial change of circumstanc 
es since the matter was previously con 
3idered by the court" Id at 123 We 
noted that pension benefit** were first rec 
ognized as marital assets in Utah in Wood 
ward v Woodward, 656 P 2d 431 (Utah 
1982) {"Woodward /") Throckmorton, 
767 P 2d at 123 We then addressed the 
!ssue whether Woodward I should be given 
retroactive effect Id We ultimately de 
termmed that ' legal recognition of a new 
category of property rights after a divorce 
decree has been entered, is not itself suffi 
cient to establish a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of 
the prior property division" Id at 124 
In the instant case, appellant has articu 
lated no change of circumstance justifying 
a reevaluation of the original property divi 
sion Appellant's claim of lack of knowl 
edge of the retirement benefits does not 
constitute such a change The only other 
possible change of circumstance is Wood 
ward i's legal recognition of retirement 
benefits as marital assets However, the 
decree of divorce was entered more than 
four years before the issuance of Wood 
ward I and the modification order was en 
tered a year before the issuance of Throck 
morton Inasmuch as Woodward / is to 
be given prospective application only, there 
»s no appropriate basis on which to divide 
respondent's retirement account Rather, 
we find the "policy interest favoring the 
finality of property settlements to be com 
pelhng Throckmorton, 767 P 2d at 124 
(quoting Guffey v LaChance, 127 Ariz 
140, 618 P 2d 634, 636 (Ct App 1980)), see 
also Porco v Porco, 752 P 2d 365, 368 
(Utah Ct App 1988) We therefore affirm 
the district court's order with respect to 
retirement benefits 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
191 Appellant contends she is impecuni 
o u s and requests attorney fees on appeal 
Athough she does not cite statute or rule 
f o r
 such an award Utah (ode Ann 
& *0-3-d (1989) provides that either party 
10
 «* divorce action may be ordered to pay 
CURTIS Utah 7 1 7 
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the attorney fees of the party in need 
This discretionary authority has been held 
to include attorney fees incurred on appeal 
See Maughan, 770 P 2d at 162-63 Based 
on appellant s financial declaration, it is 
apparent that she is in need of such assist 
ance bmce appellant has partially pre-
vailed, we award her attorney fees reason 
ably incurred on appeal 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court's order with 
respect to respondent's retirement account 
The remainder of the order is vacated 
The issue of child support is remanded for 
the entry of specific findings and an award 
of child support in accordance with those 
findings We also remand the case for the 
purpose of determining and awarding at 
torney fees and costs reasonably incurred 
by appellant on appeal 
DAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ , 
concur 
KirNUMMHSYSU V 
Lauralee CURTIS. Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v 
William Gregory CURTIS, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No 890210-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
March 27, 1990 
Former wife challenged former hus 
band s failure to return children to Utah 
from Mississippi Former husband moved 
for enforcement of Mississippi court's mod 
tftcation of child custody provisions of Utah 
divorce decree The Fourth District Court, 
Utah County Boyd L Park J , enforced 
Mississippi court's modification of custody 
Wife appealed The Court of Appeals, 
Orme J , held that (1) Mississippi court 
lacked jurisdiction to modify child custody 
while Utah court had continuing junsdic 
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$28,150 from the retirement fund to pay 
various debts, leaving approximately $8,736 
in the fund. Trial was held May 18, 1987. 
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the 
court interviewed Aaron and Mario to aid 
in its CMtody determination. A second in-
terview was conducted the following day at 
Barbara's request 
In its findings, conclusions, and decree, 
the court awarded custody of Benjamin and 
MeLea to Barbara. The court awarded the 
parties joint custody of Aaron and Mario 
wherein their principal place of residence 
would be with Barbara, but both children 
would live six months of the year with each 
party as long as both parties remained in 
Nephi, Utah. If either party moves, Bar-
bara would have custody subject to 
James's reasonable visitation rights. The 
court ordered James to pay $450 in alimo-
ny, $160 per child in child support (except 
for the time while Aaron and Mario are 
living with him), and Barbara's attorney 
fees. In its property distribution, the court 
held James violated the restraining order 
by paying off personal debts with the re-
tirement fund. The court ruled that $32,-
950 ($36,886 less $3,936 paid in taxes) 
' should have remained in the fund, one-half 
of which was credited to Barbara. Based 
on this premise, the court awarded Barbara 
exclusive possession of and one-half equity 
in the home, the $7,000 lot, the remaining 
$8,736 in the retirement fund, the car with 
clear title provided by James, and one-half 
of the proceeds from a sale of the $6,000 
lot James received one-half equity in the 
home, the partnership interest, the stock, 
and one-half of the proceeds from the 
$6,000 lot The court also ordered James 
to pay aU obligations incurred during the 
marriage except the mortgage on the 
home, liability for which was assigned to 
Barbara. 
On appeal, James first argues the trial 
court erred in not equitably dividing be-
tween the parties the obligations he paid 
out of the retirement fund. "In adjusting 
the financial interests of parties to a di-
vorce, the trial court is permitted consider-
able discretion and its actions are entitled 
to a presumption of validity." Cook v. 
Cook, 739 P.2d 90, 93 (Utah App.1987). 
Absent some clear abuse of discretion, the 
trial court's distribution of marital assets 
and liabilities will not be disturbed. Id. 
[1] Subsequent to issuance of the trial 
court's restraining order, James withdrew 
$28,150 from the retirement fund to pay 
for the following: $15,460.27 business loan 
from Zions First National Bank, $3,085.08 
pay advance and $1,622.48 loan from Paint-
er Motor, $1,589.87 loan from First Securi-
ty Bank, $2,456.28 for two motorcycles, 
and $3,936.10 in taxes. The trial court 
ruled that except for the tax payment, the 
withdrawals were in violation of its re-
straining order. The court credited Bar-
bara with half the sum that should have 
remained in the fund. James contends the 
loans he paid were marital liabilities sub-
ject to equitable division. However, he 
failed to present any documentation or oth-
er evidence to characterize the loans as 
subjecting Barbara to any liability. We 
find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
[23 James argues the court erred in not 
clearly specifying the family partnership 
interest and company stock were his sepa-
rate property. In Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Utah Su-
preme Court held, "Premarital property, 
gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as 
separate property, and in appropriate cir-
cumstances, equity will require that each 
party retain the separate property brought 
to the marriage." The trial court awarded 
James his partnership interest and stock. 
Furthermore, after removing these two as-
sets from the marital estate, the trial 
court's distribution remains equitable. 
James's contention is therefore without 
merit We also find no merit to James's 
contention regarding his responsibility to 
secure clear title to the car for Barbara. 
The property distribution is affirmed. 
[3,4] James next argues the trial 
court's conduct in interviewing the two old-
er children a second time without giving 
him notice violated his constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection. We 
find no merit to James's constitutional chal-
lenge to the second interview of Aaron and 
Mario. Even if James were notified of the 
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Cite M 752 FJUI 4 
interview, he was not entitled to be 
present Furthermore, in ruling on 
James's objections to the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, the trial court stat-
ed the second interview was held simply to 
inform the two children of the joint custody 
decision. The failure to give James notice 
of the second interview was, at most, harm-
less error. Utah R.Civ.P. 61. 
James also contends the court's findings 
are insufficient to support the custody 
award. A trial court is afforded the same 
broad discretion in making custody awards 
as it is in distributing marital property. 
However, to ensure the court acted within 
its broad discretion, the facts and reasons 
for the court's decision must be set forth 
fully in appropriate findings and conclu-
sions. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 
1988); Marekant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 
199 (Utah App.1987). "Proper findings of 
fact ensure that the ultimate custody 
award follows logically from, and is sup-
ported by, the evidence and the controlling 
legal principles." Smith v. Smith, 726 
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Although in 
equity matters this Court may review the 
evidence and make its own findings, that 
"cannot serve as an excuse for the failure 
below to furnish adequate findings to en-
sure that the trial court's discretionary de-
termination was rationally based." Mar-
tinez v. Martinet, 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1986). See Acton v. Zk/trtw, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987); Marchant, 743 P.2d at 
203 (trial court's failure to make proper 
findings is harmless error only if facts 
clearly support only a finding in favor of 
custody award). 
[51 In the instant case, the trial court 
awarded Barbara sole custody of Benjamin 
and MeLea and joint custody of Aaron and 
Mario. In its findings, the court simply 
found "[Barbara] is a fit and proper person 
to have the care, custody, and control of 
the minor children, Melea [sic] and Benja-
min." This Court has previously recog-
nised the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in 
Martinez wherein the Court held: 
A mere finding that the parties are or 
are not "fit and proper persons to be 
awarded the care, custody, and control" 
. JEFFERIES Utah 909 
9 (Vtmh App. 1988) 
of the child cannot pass muster when the 
custody award is challenged and an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion is 
urged on appeal. 
728 P.2d at 995 (quoted in Ebbert v. Efh 
bert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App.1987)). 
The findings of the trial court in the instant 
case are inadequate to support the custody 
award. Although no one set of factors 
governs a custody determination in every 
case, the trial court's findings should artic-
ulate those factors pertinent to the child's 
best interests which the court considered in 
making its determination, such as the 
needs of the child and the ability of each 
parent to meet those needs. Sanderson v. 
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987); Mar-
chant, 743 P.2d at 208. 
The decree of divorce is affirmed except 
for the custody award which is remanded 
for additional findings. 
DAVIDSON and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
(p fxcrNUMitfsnttM} 
Bra Louise JEFFERIES, Ptofcilff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
DOMM Lloyd JEFFERIES, Dafaata* 
and Appellant 
No. 870228-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 13, 1988. 
In divorce proceeding, the District 
Court, Sanpete Court, Don V. Tibbs, J., 
awarded contract receivable on motel 
owned by husband and wife as child sup-
port to their adult handicapped daughter, 
and husband appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Greenwood, J., held that (1) where 
court orders party to pay child support to 
child who has reached age of majority but 
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is nevertheless entitled to support under 
statute requiring parent to support incapac-
itated child of whatever age, court must 
enter specific findings of fact on each of 
factors set forth in statute for determining 
amount of child support, and (2) court im-
properly awarded contract to parties' inca-
pacitated adult child, where contract was 
for purpose of creating estate for child's 
permanent benefit and maintenance. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error *»1008.1(5) 
When examining court's findings of 
fact, reviewing court defers to those find-
ings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
2. Parent and Child *=»3.3(6, 7) 
When determining amount of child 
support, court must consider seven factors 
listed in statute for determining child sup-
port, and court must enter findings of fact 
on those factors. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7. 
3. Divorce *»307 
Where court, in divorce proceeding, or-
ders parent to pay child support for child 
who has reached age of majority but is 
nevertheless entitled to support under stat-
ute requiring parent to support incapacitat-
ed child of whatever age, court must enter 
specific findings of fact on each of factors 
set forth in statute for determining amount 
of child support U.C.A.1953, 78-45-2, 78-
45-7. 
4. Divorce «»307 
Court's findings of fact in divorce pro-
ceeding regarding child support order for 
adult incapacitated child were insufficient, 
where court failed to enter findings on all 
factors contained in statute for determin-
ing amount of support U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7. 
5. Divorce *»3Q8 
Court improperly awarded husband's 
and wife's contract receivable on motel to 
their incapacitated adult child in divorce 
proceeding, where award of contract was 
for purpose of creating estate for child's 
permanent benefit and maintenance; court 
could have awarded support equal to net 
contract proceeds and had those proceeds 
under control of wife for sole benefit of 
child. 
Noall T. Wootton (argued), American 
Fork, for defendant and appellant 
Richard B. Johnson (argued), Orem, for 
plaintiff and respondent 




Defendant, Donald Lloyd Jefferies, ap-
peals from a divorce decree which awarded 
a contract, owned by defendant and plain-
tiff, Eva Louise Jefferies, to their adult 
handicapped daughter. Defendant seeks 
reversal of the trial court's findings and 
remand for further findings. We reverse 
and remand. 
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced 
following forty-four years of marriage. 
During the marriage, the parties had four 
children. At the time of the divorce, all of 
the children were adults, but one child, 
Joycelyn, was thirty-seven, had a mental 
age of approximately thirteen and was de-
pendent upon plaintiff for support 
The trial court found plaintiffs earning 
ability was $136 per month from social 
security and defendant's earning capacity 
was $436 per month from social security 
and $300 per month from part-time work. 
The trial court also found that if it did not 
make provision for support of Joycelyn, she 
would become a ward of the state. The 
court then divided the parties' marital as-
sets, including contracts receivable on prop-
erties the parties sold during the marriage, 
and awarded one contract receivable, on 
the El Rancho Motel in Provo, Utah, to 
Joycelyn. The contract receivable on the 
El Rancho Motel provided for payments 
over the next 28.9 years, with a principal 
balance of $178,655 plus interest of 8.5% 
and monthly payments of $1,385. A con-
tract payable by the parties on the same 
property had a $17,846 principal balance 
payable at $500 per month for approxi-
JEFFERIES 
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mately 5.25 years. The court ordered that 
the net proceeds of the two contracts be 
placed in an account for Joycelyn's use 
with plaintiff as custodian of the monies 
and the use thereof. The court also or-
dered defendant to pay $1 per month sup-
port for Joycelyn. 
Defendant claims that the amount of 
child support was arbitrarily determined 
without consideration of the factors set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1987) 
and that the court erred in awarding the 
contract receivable to Joycelyn. 
I 
We first examine whether the trial 
court's child support award was arbitrarily 
determined without proper consideration of 
the factors set forth in section 78-45-7. 
The financial obligation of a parent to an 
incapacitated adult child is contained in sec-
tion 78-45-1 through 13 (1987), the Utah 
Uniform Civil liability for Support Act 
Sections 3 and 4 state that every man and 
every woman is required to support his or 
her child. "Child" includes "a son or a 
daughter of whatever age who is incapaci-
tated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means." Section 78-46-2(4). 
The trial court found that 
the parties have a child, Joycelyn Jeffer-
ies, who was born on December 5, 1949, 
who has a mental age of approximately 
13 years. The Court finds the parties 
have always been responsible for the 
child and that the Court must consider 
those factors in deciding this case. Spe-
cifically, the Court finds that if the Court 
does not make provision for support of 
this individual, that individual shall be-
come award [sic] of the State of Utah. 
[1] Defendant does not dispute his re-
sponsibility to provide support for Joycelyn 
so long as she is in need, nor the fact that 
she has limited capacity. Defendant does, 
however, contend that the court should 
have, but did not, consider all of the factors 
set forth in section 78-46-7. Section 78-
45-7 states: 
the court, in determining the amount of 
prospective support, shall consider all rel-
evant factors including but not limited to: 
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(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
Because those factors involve questions of 
fact, we examine the trial court's findings 
of fact and defer to those findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Walk-
er, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). It is 
well-established that "[f)ailure of the trial 
court to make findings on all material is-
sues is reversible error unless the facts in 
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment'" Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Kinkella v. BaugK 660 P.2d 233, 
236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, "[t]he find-
ings 'should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached.'" Id. 
(quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979)). 
[2-4] Section 78-45-7 requires the trial 
court to consider at least the seven factors 
listed therein. Further, those factors con-
stitute material issues upon which the trial 
court must enter findings of fact In this 
case, however, the trial court failed to en-
ter findings on all of the factors. Further, 
the facts in the record are not so clear and 
uncontroverted as to support the amount of 
child support awarded to Joycelyn. For 
example, the only evidence in the record 
regarding Joycelyn's financial needs is 
plaintiffs financial declaration, but that 
declaration does not separate plaintiffs 
and Joycelyn's financial needs. Therefore, 
we conclude that the trial court's findings 
of fact are insufficient We specifically 
hold that where the court orders a party to 
pay child support to a child who has 
reached the age of majority but is never-
theless entitled to support under section 
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-2, the court must enter specific find-
of fact on each of the factors set forth 
f section 78-46-7. Our holding should not 
interpreted to mean that the trial court's 
Incision as to the amount of child support 
§ incorrect, but only that the court's find-
igs of fact are insufficient to allow appei 
|te review of the amount awarded. 
I 
i II 
We next address whether the trial .v-u-t 
|pred in awarding the parties' contrai r--
kivable to their adult child. In Eftglun v 
\tglisK 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah Wil, 
fce Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A court may not, under a decree of di-
vorce, attempt to transfer any property 
of either parent to the children, for the 
purpose of creating an estate for their 
p^ermanent benefit Furthermore, the 
court may not make provision out of the 
property of either of the parties for the 
maintenance of children who are of age, 
and who are not physically incapacitated. 
[5] In this case, the court awarded the 
urties' personal property, the contract re-
ivable on the El Rancho Motel, to Joyce-
n. The property was clearly intended te 
ovide an estate for Joycelyn's permanent 
nefit Joycelyn would receive income of 
86 per month for the first 5.26 years of 
e contract, and, after payout of the un-
rlying obligation, $1,385 per month for 
out 23 years after that The contract 
mid provide financial resources for Joy 
tyn at least until she reached the age of 
, unless she sold or otherwise disposed of 
is asset Accordingly, the court's award 
the contract receivable to Joycelyn is 
titrary to the rule as stated in English. 
erefore, we hold that the trial court 
*ed in awarding the parties' contract re-
vable to their mentally handicapped 
lighter. 
We note, however, that this Court has no 
jection to or quarrel with the trial court's 
parent notion that support payments t>_ 
fendant for Joycelyn should be from a 
irce other than defendant's income and 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P 2d 1218, 1222 
Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court restated 
his portion of English in dicta. Because that 
that the net proceeds from the £1 Rancho 
Motel contract would be an appropriate 
source for those support payments. This 
end could be met, after making necessary 
findings of fact, by awarding support equal 
to the net contract proceeds and having 
those proceeds under the control of plain-
tiff for the sole benefit of Joycelyn. 
Reversed and remanded for proceedings 
m accordance with this opinion. 
BENCH and DAVIDSON, JJ. 
concur. 
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AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY 
and/or Employers Mutual 
Liability, Plaintiffs, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, George Roy Green, and 
die Second Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 87018S-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Uuh 
April 13, 1988. 
Employer and insurer petitioned tor 
review of Industrial Commission order 
awarding workers' compensation benefits. 
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that 
I) evidence supported Commission's find-
ing of compensable injury, and (2) claimant 
was entitled to average weekly wage based 
on a minimum of 20 hours per week, even 
though claimant only worked 13 hours per 
week. 
Affirmed in part and remanoea m part 
restatement appears to be inaccurate and be-
cause it is dicta, we do not rely on me restate-
ment in this opinion. 
AMERICAN ROOFING CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N Utah 313 
CiteM732 FJd t !2 (IfcakApp. 198S) 
1. Workers' Compensation *=>1533 
Substantial evidence supported admin-
istrative law judge's finding that workers' 
compensation claimant's on the job injury 
was "by accident"; although claimant had 
previously experienced pain in lower back 
and legs when injured while working for 
other employers, he was able to return to 
work after a period of rest and when lifting 
bucket of debris for last employer, he suf-
fered injury which rendered him totally and 
permanently disabled, unable to return to 
work. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
2. Workers' Compensation *»697, 1417 
Element of causation, a prerequisite 
for finding injury compensable under work-
ers' compensation law, requires proof of 
both legal cause and medical cause. U.C. 
A.1963, 35-1-45. 
3. Workers' Compensation *»U90 
Industrial Commission's finding that 
evidence of weight of bucket, together with 
manner in which workers' compensation 
claimant lifted bucket and fact that bucket 
snagged, combined to characterize claim-
ant's action as unusual or extraordinary so 
as to show legal causation, for workers' 
compensation purposes, was not arbitrary 
or capricious. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation *»821 
Workers' compensation claimant was 
entitled to compensation based on average 
weekly wage based on a minimum of 20 
hours per week, even though claimant only 
worked 13 hours per week. U.C.A.1963, 
35-1-67, 35-1-75, 35-l-75(lXe), UXgXiii). 
Michael E. Dyer (argued), Stephanie A. 
Mallory, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Erie V. Boorman, Adm'r, Second Injury 
Fund, Barbara Elicerio, Legal Counsel, In-
dus. Com'n, William W. Downes, Jr. (ar-
gued), Salt Lake City, for respondent 
Green. 
Elliot Morris, Workers CompensatR*. 
Fund of Utah, Salt Lake City. 




American Roofing Company (American 
Roofing) and its insurance carrier Employ-
er's Mutual liability petition this Court for 
review of an order of the Industrial Com-
mission (Commission) awarding workers' 
compensation benefits to an injured em-
ployee. 
In February 1956, George Green, an em-
ployee of J.E. Steel Company (J.E.), injures 
his lower back in an industrial accident 
He received medical treatment and, be-
tween 1956 and 1983, visited two chiroprac-
tors for occasional treatments. In Febru-
ary 1983, Green, while still employed by 
J.E., now known as Paulsen Steel Company 
(Paulsen), fell on a ladder and again injured 
his lower back. Following this injury, 
Green began experiencing severe stabbing 
pains beginning in his lower back and mov-
ing down his legs. Green would typically 
treat his pain with a hot bath and rest In 
the summer of 1983, Green left Paulsen 
and was hired by American Roofing. 
Green's pains increased in May 1985, and 
he consulted Dr. Henrie, an orthopedic sur-
geon. Dr. Henrie diagnosed a degenera-
tive spinal condition and scheduled a CAT 
scan and lumbar myelogram for September 
25, 1985. 
On September 6, while still in the employ 
of American Roofing, Green attempted to 
unload a thirty pound bucket of debris out 
of his truck. As he leaned over the bed 
and lifted the bucket, the bucket snagged 
on something and Green suffered a much 
more severe "lightning bolt" of pain in his 
back and legs. After several minutes, 
Green was able to get into his car and 
return home. He never returned to work 
again. The CAT scan and myelogram were 
performed as scheduled as well as a chemo-
nucleolysis in November 1985. Green was 
diagnosed as suffering from disc hernia-
tion. 
Green filed applications for a hearing 
seeking disability benefits from the 1988 
and 1985 accidents. After a hearing on 
May 1, 1986, the Administrative Law Judge 
A **£S =*i Sv^iems v. .. 
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C O O L 
Provo, Utah 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the 
power and authority of the court to 
determine a controversy and 
without which it cannot proceed, 
Without jurisdiction over the 
subject matter alleged in plaintiffs 
claims, the court was without aut-
hority to proceed or to enter any 
adjudication on the merits of the 
claims. 
... The jurisdictional limits of u 
statutorily created court, such as the 
circuit court, are circumscribed by 
its empowering legislation. A circuit 
court cannot expand its jurisdiction 
to adjudicate claims which are in 
excess of $10,000 or which involved 
he title to real property. Unlike a 
court's exercise of jurisdiction over 
a person or party, subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be created or 
conferred on the court by consent 
or waiver, 
(citations omitted.) This court further noted 
that the trial court was under an obligation, 
even absent an objection, to determine its 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
claims asserted. Id. Having determined that 
the matter was outside its jurisdiction, the trial 
court could proceed only by dismissal. Tran-
sworld seeks to distinguish Thompson on the 
basis that that case concerned the $10,000 
jurisdictional limit and the limitation regarding 
real property matters. The distinction is 
without merit because the same principles 
apply equally to the exception to jurisdiction 
.nvolved in this case. "Since the entire proce-
edings before the circuit court were conducted 
absent jurisdiction, they are a nullity and are 
void." hi The appeal is dismissed, and this 
case is remanded to the circuit court with 
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Green wooa. Judge 
Russei W Bench Judge 
Richtr a i_4in, Judge 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Appellant appeals from a final order of tne 
trial court which modified a divorce decree by 
increasing child support payments and denied 
appellant's counterpetition for modification. 
We affirm in part, but vacate the support 
award and remand the case for further proc-
eedings and entry of additional findings. 
Appellant Frank Durfee and appellee 
Marilyn Durfee were divorced in 1978. App-
ellee received custody of their two children 
then aged two and six. Appellant was requirec 
to pay $150 per child per month as child 
support. 
In 1988, appellee filed a petition to amenc 
the decree of divorce and asked that chile 
support be increased to a minimum of $300 
per child per month. The suggested basis for 
the increase was that expenses for the two 
children had increased and that appellant's 
income had increased substantially since the 
original divorce decree was entered in 1978 
Appellee also sought reimbursement for half 
of the medical, dental, and optical expenses 
incurred by the minor children which were not 
paid by insurance. 
Appellant filed a counterpetition asking, in 
relevant part, that his obligation to pay 
support for the older son be terminated 
because the child lives with his maternal gra-
ndmother during the school year. Appellant 
also asked that appellee be required to execute 
the appropriate forms to allow appellant to 
claim the two children as exemptions on his 
state and federal income tax returns. 
After a trial was held on January 13, 1989. 
the trial court entered an order on February 
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27, 1989 which increased child support to $323 
per month for the younger child, then age 12, 
and $375 per month for the older child, then 
age 16. The trial court calculated these 
amounts based solely on the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines, Utah Code of Judicial 
Admin., Appendix H, (1988) (hereinafter 
referred to as the "1988 Guidelines").* The 
court also required each party to assume and 
pay half of the children's unpaid medical, 
hospital, dental, orthodontic, and optical j 
expenses not paid by insurance. Furthermore, j 
the trial court denied appellant's counterpet-
ition. 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN I 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 
finding a material change of circumstances due 
to an increase in appellant's gross tncome and j 
an increase in the cost of providing for the I 
children as they grow older. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 I 
(1989), the trial court has continuing junsdi- j 
ction to modify child support obligations. "On I 
a petition for a modification of a divorce 
decree, the threshold requirement for relief is 
a showing of a substantial change of circum-
stances occurring since the entry of the decree 
and not contemplated in the decree itself." Stet-
tier v. Stettlcr, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 
1985). 
The trial court found that appellant's gross 
income increased from approximately $29,000 
per year in 1978 to approximately $45,000 per 
year in 1988 for an increase of approximately 
$16,000. Appellant contends that the trial 
court erred in determining his 1978 and 1988 
salaries and that the actual increase was only 1 
approximately $9,000. The court's findings on 
this issue, however, arc not clearly erroneous. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Grayson Roper 
Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989). In any event, the disparity 
was harmless since even the substantial incr-
ease proposed by appellant would have suff-
iced to establish a material change of circum-
stances. 
Appellant contends that "it could not reas-
onably be argued [that] such a modest increase 
in salary was not contemplated by the parties 
at the time of the entry of decree of divorce. * 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated i 
an increase of income in their own minds or in 
their discussions does not mean that the decree j 
itself contemplates the change. In order for a j 
material change in circumstances to be conte- I 
mplated in a divorce decree there must be 
evidence, preferably in the form of a provision 
within the decree itself, that the trial court 
anticipated the specific change. See Christe- j 
nsen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1300 j 
(Utah 1981) (substantial, unexpected increase 
in father's income did not constitute a subst- | 
antial change in circumstances when original 
divorce decree required father to pay supple-
mental child support payments equal to one 
half of his increase in income over a set 
amount); see aiso Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 
726, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (there was no 
substantial change in circumstances where the 
trial court reasonably anticipated that plaintiff 
would increase her earnings by a specific 
amount). Since the divorce decree at issue did 
not have a provision expressly anticipating an 
increase in appellant's income, and since 
appellant did not offer any evidence at trial 
that the trial court had previously anticipated 
the increase in income when the original 
divorce decree was entered, we find that the 
increase was not a material change in circu-
mstances contemplated in the original divorce 
decree. 
Since the substantial increase in appellant's 
income constitutes a material change of circ-
umstances sufficient to provide a basis for 
modification of the decree, see, e.g., Maughan 
v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), we need not address the issue of 
whether ihe aging of a child may also consti-
tute a material change of circumstances. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
Appellant next argues that the trial court 
erred in its determination of child support by 
applying the 1988 Guidelines without exami-
ning the actual expenses attributable to *thc 
children, and by not considering appellant's 
ability to provide support. 
"The [trial court's} apportionment of fina-
ncial responsibility between the parties will not 
be upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or we determine 
that the court has abused its discretion. * Ostler 
v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (citations omitted). We find that, 
the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to enter sufficient findings of fact to support 
the child support ordered. 
The "Overview" section of the 1988 Guide-
lines clearly indicated that the guidelines were 
only advisory to the court. Section I, parag-
raph 1, stated that "{flinal orders in all case& 
shall be made at the discretion of the court 
based upon the facts of the individual case." 
At the time of these proceedings, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1987)* provided that 
(2) When ... a material change in 
circumstances has occurred, the 
court, in determining the amount of 
prospective support, shall consider 
all relevant factors including bui 
not limited to: 
a) the standard of living and situa 
tion of the parties; 
b) the relative wealth and income o. 
the parties; 
c) the ability of the obligor to e«irn. 
d) the ability of the ooligec ;o cam 
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e) the need of the obligee, 
0 the age of the parties; 
g) the responsibility of the obligor 
for the support of others. 
These factors 'constitute matermi issues 
upon which the trial court must en;er findings 
of fact.* Jeffcrics v. Jcffencs, 752 P.2d 909, 
911 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
It is well-established thai *if}aiiure 
of the trial court to make findings 
on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record 
are 'clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment.'* 
Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella 
v. Baugh, 6 6 0 P . 2 d 2 3 3 , 
236 (Utah 1983). IThese findings) 
•should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ult-
imate conclusion on each factual 
issue was reached.* (quoting Rocker 
v. Da/ton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(Utah 1979). 
Jeffries, 752 P.2d at 911. 
In this case, the trial court's findings are 
"clearly inadequate to demonstrate that the 
trial court considered the relevant factors in 
determining [the) child support awards. Det-
ailed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are necessary for this reviewing court to ensure 
that the trial court's discretionary determina-
tion of the ... child support awards was rati-
onally based.* Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 
952, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We further 
find that the facts in the record are not clear 
and uncontroverted in support of the amount 
of the child support awarded, which was based 
solely on the advisory amounts provided by 
the 1988 Guidelines. We therefore reverse the 
trial court's order increasing the amount of 
child support. 
EXTENDED ABSENCE OF CHILD 
Appellant also argues that the trial court 
erred in denying his request to terminate child 
support payments to appellee for their oldest 
child because appellee did not maintain cont-
inuous physical custody of the child. The 
extended absence of the oldest child from 
appellee during the school year, however, did 
not extinguish appellant's obligation to 
provide adequate child support. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45-3 (1987). The legal 
obligation to support one's child may only be 
terminated by the legal adoption of the child 
by another person. See Riding v. Riding, 8 
Utah 2d 136, 139, 329 P.2d 878, 880 (1958). 
Appellant is therefore not excused from his 
obligation to support his oldest child simply 
because the child resides with and receives care 
from a third party, in this case his grandmo-
¥. D u r U . CODE • co 
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ther. See In re Olscn, 111 Utah 365, 180 P.2a 
210, 213-14 (1947) (*The fact that the mat 
ernal grandparents honored the request of the 
dying mother to look after the children cert-
ainly did not absolve the father of the duty to 
furnish them necessaries."). 
Although the child's extended absence from 
the appellee does not excuse appellant from 
his legal duty to provide support, we agree 
with appellant that the child support he pro-
vides must be applied to the child's care. We 
disagree with appellant, however, that such 
support payments must, as a rule, be delivered 
directly to the third party providing the care. 
The means by which child support payment > 
are made is to be designed by the trial court. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (1989). *Thc 
trial court may fashion such equitable order 
in relation to the children and their support as 
is reasonable and necessary ....* Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
Typically, child support payments are made to 
the custodial parent because the custodial 
parent, by reason of physical custody, incurs 
the expenses of caring for the child. A trial 
court may, however, determine that it is in the 
best interest of the child to have support 
payments made directly to a third-party care 
provider during the child's extended absence. 
A trial court may, on the other hand, decline 
to order payments directly to the third party if 
it concludes that the support paid to the cus-
todial parent will likely be applied to the care 
of the child during the extended absence. A 
trial court therefore has discretion to make 
such arrangements as may be required by the 
circumstances of a given case to ensure that a 
child receives the support ordered. 
Testimony at trial indicated that appellee 
forwarded the child support payments to the 
grandmother for the benefit of the child while 
the child was living with the grandmother. 
Since the evidence was clear and uncontrove-
rted that prior support payments had been 
applied to the support of the child, and since 
there was no indication that the payments 
would not in the future be applied to the 
support of the child, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to deny appel-
lant's counterpetition to terminate child 
support payments to appellee during the ext-
ended absence. 
CONCLUSION 
We have reviewed the other issues raised by 
appellant and find them to be without merit. 
We affirm the trial court's conclusion that a 
material change in circumstances has occurred. 
We also affirm the denial of appellant's cou-
nterpetition. We vacate the trial court's order 
increasing the amount of child support and 
remand the question of the amount of child 
support for further proceedings and entry of 
additional findings. 
No costs or attorney feci awarded on 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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appeal. 
Russell W Bench, jua&c j 
WE CONCUR 
Richard C. Davidson, judge 
Gregory K. Grme, Judge 
1. Pursuant to section I, paragraph 5, of the 1988 
Guidelines, the three-child schedule was used to 
take into account appellant's duty to support the 
two children from his marriage to appellee, and a 
child from his current marriage. The 1988 Guidel-
ines were repealed in 1989. Effective April 23, 1990, 
new child support guidelines were adopted and 
codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-2 and 78-
45-7.2 through-7.18 and apply to child support 
modifications on or after July 1, 1989. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7 (1987) was 
amended in 1989. See note I. 
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This case was previously appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court. Thorsen v. Johnson, 
745 P.2d 1243 (Utah 1987) (Thorsen 1). The 
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed 
m part for reconsideration of damages. We 
affirm the trial court's reassessment of 
damages. 
t T41- \DVAi 
45 
FACTS 
In the original action. Gooseberry Estates 
brought an action against Thorsen for 
damages Thorsen caused to Gooseberry's 
property located in Sevier County. Gooseberry 
owned approximately 94 acres of undeveloped 
land which it intended to develop as a subdi-
vision. Thorsen, who was a downstream water 
user opposed to the development, discovered 
that he owned an inactive water easement 
across the property. The original ditch, which 
was one foot deep and between two and three 
feet wide, was washed out in many places and 
barely visible. Thorsen entered the property 
and excavated the ditch, making it much 
larger. In the process, he uprooted several 
hundred trees and left huge rocks and other 
debris strewn about the property. His efforts 
destroyed the possibility of developing the 
property. 
After a bench trial, the trial court concluded 
that Thorsen caused $54,000 in damages cal-
culating the value of the land as a completed 
subdivision. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that determination of value on the completed 
subdivision basis was incorrect. It instead set 
forth the following test: 
IGJenerally the measure of damages 
for injury to real property is the 
difference between the vaiue of the 
property immediately before and 
immediately after the injury .... 
Thorsen, 745 P.2d at 1244-45. 
The case was remanded to the trial court. 
The trial court reviewed additional evidence in 
the form of uncontradicted affidavits1 subm-
itted by Gooseberry's experts and determined 
that Thorsen caused $38,785 in damages to the 
property.2 Thorsen appeals that judgment, 
arguing that the trial court again incorrectly 
determined the measure of damages. 
In the original opinion, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the value of the land prior to 
damage was Si,250 per acre. Thorsen, V~ 
P.2d at 1246. It also concluded that Gooseb-
erry was entitled to damages. Id. at 1244-45. 
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that it 
is proper for the trial court to figure damage* 
viewing the property's value in light of its 
intended use: 
It is proper to show that a partic-
ular tract of land is suitable arte 
available for subdivision into lots 
and is valuable for that purpose. It 
is not proper, however, to show the 
number and value of lots as separ-
ated parcels in an imaginary subd-
ivision thereof. Stated differently, « 
is improper for the jury to consider 
an undeveloped tract of land ai 
though a subdivision thereon is an 
accomplished fact. Such undevel-
oped property may not be valued 
E REPORTS 
Johnson 
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10. Sec generdlly Groene^eid v Camano Btuepomi 
Oyster Co., 196 Wash 54. 61, 81 P.2d 826, 829 
(1938). 
11. Wilson v Schneitcr's Riverside Golf Course, 
523 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1974); see Condos v. 
Trapp, 717 P.2d 827, 830-32 (Wyo. 1986). 
12. Condos, 111 P.2d at 830. 
1J Id. ai 831-32 (last grantee is one who last 
records — -t ^Iso Utah Code Ann §§68-3-
1.-2 (;*-e , J £ JO of common law to statute). 
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O P I N I O N 
O R M E , Judge: 
Appellant, John Franklin Ailred, appeals 
from an order which requires nis former wife, 
Gaydi S. Ailred, to pay $100 per month in 
child support , with those payments to be 
deposited into an interest-bearing account 
earmarked for their child 's college education 
and disbursable only on the further order of 
the court . He argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to make adeq-
uate findings of fact, in setting the level of 
child support at a level below Ms. Allred's 
ability to pay, and in ordering that the support 
payments be placed beyond his reach. We 
reverse and remand. 
F A C T S 
The parties were divorced in 1981. For 
nearly five years, Ms. Ailred had custody of 
ihe parties' three minor children, Aaryn, 
Derek, and Corey. Mr. Allred's monthly court 
ordered child support was $350 per child. 
In January 1986, the parties stipulated to 
give custody of Derek to Mr. Ailred and to 
cease Mr. Allred's $350 payment for Derek's 
support . Moreover, Ms. Ailred agreed to 
cow • Co 
Provo, Utah 
"pay" Mr. Ailred $100 monthly for the 
support of Derek. As a convenience, the 
parties stipulated that her monthly payment be 
made in the form of a credit against what Mr 
Ailred was required to pay, and thereafter he 
accordingly paid Ms. Alired $600 per month 
toward the support of the two children still in 
her custody. 
In late 1987, Corey also began living with 
Mr. Ailred. On January 19, 1988, Mr. Ailred 
filed a petition for modification of the divorce 
decree requesting a formal change of custody 
for Corey and seeking child support . Mr 
Alired was awarded custody of Corey on 
October 7, 1988. On December 21 , 1988, a 
hearing was held to decide the issues of child 
support , insurance, and medical expenses for 
Corey. 
The trial court made several findings. Fin 
dings concerning Ms. Ailred were that 1) she 
earned an annual salary of $29,000; 2) Aaryn 
having reached her majority, Ms. Ailred has 
no minor children in her custody dependent on 
her for support; and 3) she is unable to 
provide medical coverage for her children on 
the insurance policy provided by her employer 
The court found that Mr. Ailred 1) earned 
$80,000 in 1986, $52,000 in 1987, and $80,000 
in 1988; 2) has experienced a reduction in his 
law practice during the past three years, and it 
is unlikely that his income in the future will 
equal or exceed his income for the preceding 
three years; 3) has two minor children in his 
custody dependent on him for support; and 4) 
purchases health and accident insurance for 
himself and the two children at a price of $104 
per month . The court also found that, under 
the advisory child support guidelines then 
contained in the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, the total support amount 
recommended for Corey would be "$937.99 of 
which $255 was allocable to (Ms. AllredJ with 
$683.00 allocable to (Mr. Ailred].* The court 
declined to embrace the guideline recommen-
dation, but also failed to find what was actu 
ally needed for Corey's support , either to 
assure him a level of support equal to what he 
would have received had there been no divorce 
or in terms of what would be appropriate 
given his present circumstances. 
The court ' s pertinent conclusions were as 
follows: 
1. The defendant is entitled u» 
child support from plaintiff for the 
minor child Corey Ailred. 
2. The court elects not to apply 
the support amount derived from 
the child support guidelines. 
3. Plaintiff should pay IO defen 
dant the sum of $100.00 per month 
... for the minor child Corey Ailred 
until such time as the minor child 
Corey Ailred obtains the age of 18 
years and completes high school. 
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5. The defendant shall be solely 
responsible tor the maintenance of 
insurance for the minor children 
and solely responsible for all costs | 
of medical and dental care not j 
covered by such insurance. 
In its findings and conclusions, the court did 
not explain why it elected not to apply the 
support guidelines or what factors prompted it 
to set an award significantly below that sugg-
ested by the guidelines. 
In a subsequent hearing, the court ordered 
that Ms. Ailred pay the child support into an 
interest-bearing account in Corey 's name, 
rather than having it paid to Mr. Alired for 
the on-going support needs of Corey. In 
support of this order, the court made the 
following findings: (1) Mr. Alired had previ-
ously been given a similar opportunity to 
satisfy a $1000 judgment for back child 
support by placing the money in interest-
bearing accounts for the children; (2) it would 
be a good thing for Corey to have the oppo-
rtunity to attend college; (3) it would be more 
palatable for Ms. Alired than would be paying 
the money directly to Mr. Ailred; and (4) Mi . 
Ailred did not actually need the money to 
support Corey. In the latter regard, the court 
remarked: "I think {Ms. AllredJ is right. You 
know, you can support these children okay. 
The $100.00 a month isn't going to make the 
difference between them having shoes and not 
having shoes." 
On appeal, Mr. Ailred argues that the trial 
court failed to make adequate findings of fact 
to justify the amount of child support to be 
contributed by Ms. Ailred. He also argues that 
the court erred in ordering that the support be 
paid into an interest bearing account earma-
rked for Corey 's college education. We 
reverse and remand for reconsideration of the 
support award and for the entry of adequate 
findings supporting an appropriate award. 
S T A N D A R D O F REVIEW 
Ordinarily, we accord the trial court consi-
derable discretion in adjusting the financial 
interests of divorced parties and, thus, the 
court ' s "actions are entitled to a presumption 
of validity." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 
1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App . 1987). However, 
where the court has abused its discretion in 
apportioning those financial responsibilities, 
we cannot affirm that determination. Id. See 
also Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). One such abuse we have rec-
ognized in this area of the law is the failure to 
enter specific, detailed findings supporting 
each of the factors which must be considered 
when making a child support award. Stevens 
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah Ct. 
App 1988), Jeffries v. Jeltries, 752 P.2d 909, 
911-12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). With this sta-
ndard in mind, we analyze the adequacy ol the 
court ' s findings in this case. 
ADEQUACY OF TRIAL C O U R T ' S 
FINDINGS 
At the time of this dispute, the Utah Code 
provided, with our emphasis, that upon a 
material change in the circumstances of a 
divorced couple, such as the change in 
Corey 's custody in this case, 
t he c o u r t , in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e 
amount of prospective support , shall 
c o n s i d e r all r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s 
including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and 
situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income 
ot the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to 
earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee io 
earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the r e spons ib i l i t y of the 
obligor for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann . §78-45-7(2) (I987).« This 
court has recognized that "[sjection 78-45-7 
requires the trial court to consider at least the 
seven factors listed ... [and to] enter findings 
on all of the factors." Jeffries, 752 P.2d at 
911 (emphasis added) . When the court fails to 
enter adequate findings on each relevant 
factor, it is reversible error unless the undis-
puted evidence clearly establishes the factor or 
factors on which findings are missing. Ostler, 
789 P.2d at 715. Findings are adequate only if 
they are "sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue was reached." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct . App . 1988) (quoting 
Acton v. De/iran, 737 P.2d 996. 999 (Utah 
1987)). 
Although the court in this case entered fin-
dings on some of the factors listed in §78-45-
7(2), the findings as a whole are insufficient, 
especially since they omit any finding on the 
critical question of the total amount needed 
for Corey's monthly support, other than to 
reject what the advisory guidelines would 
suggest. Moreover, the findings do not indi-
cate how the court reached its ultimate deter-
mination of $100 per m o n t h - a figure which 
has no discernible basis in the evidence other 
than it was the figure the parties previously 
stipulated could be paid for Derek's support 
when his custody shifted to Mr. Alired. 
The $100 award in this case may reflect the 
court ' s erroneous view of how to fix child 
! support in the instant context. At one point m 
• the trial, the court had the following exchange 
I with the pai ties: 
Ms. Alired: .. But my question is. 
it 1 was able to raise three children 
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on $33 000 a year I question why 
John is asking me lor child supper 
o raise two on eighty That s ail 
have to say 
The Court Ail right Mr Ailrcd 
she is probably r.ght 
Later, the court stated to Mr Allied "l th , k 
that she should pay something for the 
support of the child, although your income is 
greater than hers I am going to order that she 
pay the $100 a month " Finally, as noted 
earlier, at the second hearing, the court justi 
Tied placement of the funds into a trust 
account by stating 
You know, you can support those 
children okay The $100 a month 
isn't going to make the difference 
between them having shoes and not 
having shoes I am going to give 
the child an opportunity to have a 
little money to go to college, and it 
would be a good thing for him 
Each of these statements appears to reflect the 
view that because Mr Alfred's salary was 
sufficient to support the children, any amount 
from Ms Allred need only be a token gesture * 
The taw does not support this position 
The trend of the law today is "toward equal 
ights and responsibilities for women req 
mnng that the wife contribute child support if 
she is financially able in an amount approxi 
mately proportional to her financial ability " 
Propriety of Decree in Proceeding Between 
Divorced Parents to Determine Mother's Duty 
to Pay Support for Children in Custody of 
Father, 98 A L R 3d 1146, 1150 (1980) Alt 
hough apparently never addressing this precise 
ssuc before, Utan appellate courts have rec 
ognized that "both parents have an obligation 
to support their children * Woodward v 
Woodward, 709 P 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) 
^per curiam) This notion of equal rcsponsib 
aty is also apparent as a matter of statutory 
law in Utah J 
Because the court's findings were not ade 
quate to support its award and appear to have 
oeen tainted by its erroneous view of the 
extent to which Ms Allred should be expected 
io contribute to Corey's support we must 
emand for reconsideration of the support 
award and for the entry of adequate findings 
supporting an appropnate award 
We do not intend our remand to be merely 
an exercise in bolstering and supporting the 
conclusion already reached Although we 
annot decide from the record before us that 
$100 is an inadequate award as a matter of 
law, we "note the apparent inadequacy in the 
amount of the child support award " Ostler 
789 P 2d at 715 One hundred dollars is well 
below the amount suggested by either the 
advisory support guidelines in effect at the 
t me of the trial or the subsequently enacted 
statutory guidelines now in effect * See Utah 
c O U L • c 
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Code Ann §78 45 7 2(1 )(a) (1990) Evei 
when not directly applicable support guide 
mes may be relevant in considering the adec, 
uacy of an award See Ostler 789 P 2d at 715 
16 (noting Utah's current guidelines), Man 
inez v Martinez 754 P 2d 69 73 (Utah C t 
App 1988) (noting guidelines from other 
jurisdictions) 
On remand the trial court should employ a 
systematic approach, tailored to this situation 
where both parents are gainfully employed 
which will insure a proper outcome While this 
approach has not been clearly enunciated tr 
any prior child support decision, it is consis 
tent with those decisions It does not ignore 
the statutorily mandated factors to be cons 
idered, but merely accords them a sensible 
priority It is an approach which now enjoys 
statutory sanction, see note 8, infra, although 
it would be appropriate even without this 
legislative endorsement First, the trial cour 
must find the amount of total support needed 
for the child Jeffries, 752 P 2d at 911 Tna 
figure should ideally "assure the children a 
standard of living comparable to that which 
they would have experienced if no divorce had 
occurred "$ Ostler, 789 P 2d at 716 (quoting 
Peterson v Peterson 748 P 2d 593, 596 (Utah 
Ct App 1988)) Once the total cost ot 
support is ascertained, the trial court can 
determine through a fairly simple mathemat 
ical operation each parent's proportional 
share of that support with reference to eaci 
parent's share of tbeir comb.ned income -
Other things being equal the amounts deter 
mined through the use of this formula will be 
ihe amounts each parent must contribute 
However, the court may go on to constde 
other appropriate factors, including those 
listed in §78 45 7(2), and adjust these 
amounts as needed if unusual urcumsw-
exist 7 Unusual circumstances prompting 
adjustment of the respective support fi^ L 
must be adequately supported by dei-
findings * 
Whether $100 is an adequate award given 
application of this approach remains to be 
seen If it takes just under $400 a month to 
support Corey, but there are no unusual arc 
umstances prompting some adjustment, then 
$100 per month is just right If it takes cons 
iderably more than that to support him, but 
unusual circumstances exist in Ms Allred's 
favor for which no countervailing circumsta 
nces exist in Mr Allred's favor, it may still be 
acceptable But n it takes more than $400 per 
month to support Corey and no such unusual 
circumstances are shown Ms Allred's 
support obligation needs to be increased to an 
amount proportional to her income 
We reverse and remand for reconsideration 
of the support award using the analytical 
approach outlined herein The final determi 
nation must be supported by adequate findings 
made in the course of employing this appr 
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The court ordered the $100 support pa>rn 
ents to be placed into a trust account es^emi 
ally for the purpose of "giv[ingl the thud an 
opportunity to have a little money to go to 
college " As previously noted a child support 
award "should approximate actual need and, 
when possible assure the children a standard 
ol living comparable to that which they would 
have experienced if no divorce had occurred " 
Ostler, 789 P 2d at 716 (quoting Peterson v 
Peterson, 748 P 2d 593, 5% (Utah Ct App 
1988)) Placing child support payments into a 
trust fund beyond the reach of the custodial 
parent does not serve the immediate needs of 
the child and thus does not serve the purpose 
of the obligation Thus, we hold that once the 
support obligation has been properly determ 
ined it must be paid direcuy o Mr Allred or 
otherwise made available o him for the on 
going support of Corey 
Gregory k Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Richard C Davidson Judge 
Russell W Bench, Judge 
1 We quoie the statute as it existed when this case J 
was decided it has subsequently been amended 
principally to lake into consideration the existence 
of new statutory child support guidelines and the 
relationship of the factors to those guidelines and 
to expand subsection (e) to include the needs of the ] 
obligor and the child as well as those of the obligee 
See Utah Code Ann §78 45 7(3) (1990) 
2 The court s order placing ihe money into a kind 
of trust account for college is itself indicative of the 
court s erroneous view concerning child support 
Child support should be used to "assure the children ' 
a standard of living comparable to that which they ! 
would have experienced if no divorce had occurred " 1 
Ostler 789 P 2d at 716 not to assure that the child j 
will have money in the future even for such worthy 
pursuits like a college education ! 
3 Utah statutes draw no distinction in terms of 
support duty between custodial and non custodial 
parents nor between fathers and mothers The duty 
of both is ihe same "Every man shall support his 
child " Uiah Code Ann §78 45 3 (1987) 
"Every woman shall support her child " Utah 
Code Ann §78 45 4(1987) 
4 As recognized by the court in its findings and 
onclusions the advisory support guidelines would 
nave imposed a support obligation on Ms Allred of 
approximately $255 Utah Code of Judicial Admin 
app H (1988) An award under the statutory guid 
-hies now in effect would be approximately $2SO 
J t a h Code Ann §§78 45 7 7 7 14 (1990) 
However the level of support fixed in this case is 
additionally skewed against Mr Allred by the fact 
hat 100% ol one aspect of Corey s support 
namely medical expenses was to be borne exdusi 
vely by Mr Allred It may well be prudent to 
require Mr Allred to continue to pay medical ins 
irancc premiums on behalt ot Corey so long as 
those amounts are properly credited as part ot the 
support Mr Allred is contributing But the deduct 
ible co payment and other out of pocket 
medical expenditures should either be built into the 
court s calculation of Corey s monthly total 
support need and shared proportionally in that way 
or those expenses should be defrayed by the parties 
on a proportional basis as they are incurred 
5 The advisory guidelines apparently suggested a 
total support amount for Corey of $937 99 The 
court did not indicate in its findings whether this 
amount would provide the standard of living Corey 
might have assuming no divorce nor did it find what 
would constitute that amount nor the amount 
needed to support him under his present circumsta 
nces 
6 The child suppo i worksheet completed by Mr 
Allred for the support hearing suggested that Ms 
Allred s proportionate share of Corey s support 
based upon their combined income would be app 
roximalely 27% 
7 The findings currently before ihis court do noi 
establish any unusual circumstances applicable to 
either party which suggest that Ms Allred s suppor 
payments should be increased or decreased beyond 
her proportional share Persuasive reasons for adj 
ustment may include among other things a party s 
significant accumulated wealth over and above his 
or her salary an extraordinary debt burden incurred 
for non discretionary items medical problems 
requiring exceptional on going expense a history 
of "below scale" support levels during the time when 
the parent now having custody and seeking support 
from the other parent had been the parent paying 
support or competing demands on his or her 
income in ihe form ot support for other dependents 
8 The orderly scheme just outlined has now been 
statutorily adopted Calculation of the parent s 
support obligation is defined in Utah Code Ann 
§78 45 7 7 (1990) which provides in pertinent 
pan 
(1) The parents child support obligation 
shall be divided between them in prop 
onion to their adjusted gross incomes 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical 
custody and split custody as defined in 
Sec t ion 78 45 2 the to t a l child 
support awa d shall be determined as 
follows 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross 
incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obhg 
ation using the child support obligation 
table 
(b) Calculate each parent s proporti 
onate share of the base combined child 
support obligation by multiplying the 
combined child support obligation by 
each parent s percentage of combined 
adjusted gross income 
"ITJhe award amounts resulting from the apphc 
anon of the guidelines are presumed to be correc 
Utah Code Ann §78 45 n 2(2>(b) i!990, uu» 
may be rebutted if there is 
| {a) written finding or specific finding on 
the record supporting the conclusion 
that complying with a provision of the 
guidelines or ordering an award amount 
resulting from the use of the guidelines 
I would be unjust inappropriate or not 
j in the best interest of a child 
t i All y ) H N t r Rl PORTS 
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Utah Code A n n . §78-45-7.2(3) (1990) If the 
court finds sufficient evidence to suggest deviation 
from the guidelines, the court shall establish support 
after considering all relevant factors , including those 
listed in §78-45-7(3)(I990). 
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OPINION 
NEWEY. Judge: 
Defendant Devin Anderson was convicied of 
the theft of $17.75-worth of gasoline in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 
(1990). After receiving evidence of prior theft 
convictions, the trial court in this case deter-
mined that Anderson had earlier been twice 
convicted of theft, and, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(b)(ii) (1990), 
classified this crime as a third-degree felony. 
Anderson appeals the classification of this 
offense, and we reverse its classification as a 
third-degree felony. 
To establish two prior theft convictions, the 
State introduced evidence drawn from records 
of the Utah circuit courts and consisting 
mainly of preprinted forms filled in by a court 
clerk. One such form was entitled 
"Information," dated "8 Dec 1981," and 
captioned "Salt Lake City ... vs. Anderson, 
Devin." In it, a person whose name is illegible 
complains that a Devin Anderson committed 
petty larceny by stealing "merchandise having 
a value not exceeding $100.00 ....* The disp-
osition of the charge is not shown except in 
notes apparently made by the clerk after loc-
ating the records in 1988, notes which say that 
the "Defendant was convicted of the charge 
below." The clerk who located the records did 
not testify at trial; from the signature certif-
ying the copies, the clerk's name appears to 
be "Chris Peifili," although it is difficult to 
read the handwritten surname. 
Another form dated "12 02-83* showed 
the plaintiff as "SLC," a common abbrevia-
tion for Salt Lake City, and "Devin Ande-
rson" as the defendant. The defendant was not 
further identified. The name of a circuit judge 
appeared and a notation indicated that the 
defendant acted pro se, but plaintiff's counsel 
was not listed. The only indication of what 
took place in this case was the following 
cryptic, handwritten notation: 
1589DPWOC 
c/o sent-15 dsjspf $200.00 
1202-83 
At trial, the State proffered tie testimony of 
Carolyn Bullock, a court cler*. to the effect 
that this notation would indicate a conviction 
for retail theft. 
The State's final exhibit was entitled 
"Circuit Court Criminal Case Filing/ 
Disposition Report" dated "11/8/82 from 
the then Ninth Circuit Court, Cedar City 
Department. It showed the defendant as 
"Devin Lincoln Anderson" and identified him 
by date of birth and gender. Defendant was 
charged with "defrauding an innkeeper" in 
violation of local ordinance 38-15. The form 
further indicates that the defendant changed 
his plea to guilty and the case was concluded 
on that basis, with the defendant sentenced to 
pay a fine and make restitution. The form r 
not signed. 
Based on this evidence, the trial court founn 
that all three exhibits established prior convi 
ctions of Anderson for theft-type offenses. 
and accordingly enhanced the penalty fo= 
Anderson's present conviction pursuant ic 
section 76-6-412(1 Kb) (ii). Before the tna. 
court and here on appeal, Anderson ar£ue 
that the penalty should not have been c ir 
need because the State failed to show 1--
judgments against Anderson had been vu_... 
entered in the prior proceedings. 
At common law, the judgment in a criminal 
case was usually nothing more than the oral 
declaration of guilt and sentence, pronounced 
while a clerk took notes.2 The practice of 
rendering oral judgments in criminal cases has 
persisted to this day in many courts, including 
apparently many of the Utah circuit courts, 
despite sound reasons opposing its continua-
tion. Those reasons include the following: (1) 
entry of a time-stamped, written judgment 
fixes clearly on the recoid the date of the 
judgment, thereby simplifying the question of 
when the time begins to run for post-trial 
motions, filing notice of appeal, and for any 
probation ordered;3 (2) a written judgment in 
proper form is clear evidence of the defen-
dant's conviction in later proceedings;4 (3) a 
written judgment signed by the judge helps 
assure the absence of clerical error or misun-
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derstanding in the record and shows that res-
ponsibility for the judgment rests on the sho-
ulders of the judge; and (4) it provides at least 
the beginning of a basis for meaningful review 
of the judgment.5 Accordingly, the Model 
Penal Code §§7.03 and 7.04, the American 
Bar Association Standard for Criminal Justice 
18-6.6, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(b)(1), and many states* have departed from 
the common law practice and require entry of 
a written result in a criminal case. 
In Utah, the end of the former practice of 
unwritten criminal judgments is mandated by 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81(e), which 
serves generally to unify civil and criminal 
procedure in Utah except where a statute or 
rule provides otherwise for criminal cases.7 We 
know of no statute or rule countermanding* in 
criminal cases the requirement of Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 58A that the court (or the 
clerk in the case of a verdict) sign and file a 
written judgment;' on the contrary, a criminal 
statute requires that the judgment state in 
writing the reasons for any required restitu-
tion. w We see no reason why the circuit court 
should be required to adjudicate civil cases in 
writing pursuant to rule 58A but nevertheless 
impose the more onerous criminal penalties 
and leave only a vague, secondary record of 
the judgment. 
In this case, the 1981 information is not a 
conviction, but rather only a charge." There is 
nothing in that case to show that the defen-
dant was convicted of the charged petty 
larceny except the notation nine years later of 
an unidentified Chris P«. The cryptic 
notations from 1983 can be deciphered as 
showing a conviction only with recourse to the 
interpretation of an experienced circuit court 
clerk familiar with the clerical shorthand of 
the time, but in themselves are utterly vague 
and unintelligible.12 The 1982 record is consi-
derably better than those from 1981 and 1983, 
but still fails to comply with the requirement 
of rules 58A(b) and 81(e) that the court sign 
the judgment. Absent any showing that a 
signed, written judgment against Anderson 
was entered, the evidence is inadequate to 
support the trial court's finding that Anderson 
had been twice convicted of theft. Thus, the 
finding to that effect is clearly erroneous. See 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). Our ruling thus requires that a judg-
ment of prior conviction be written, clear and 
definite, and signed by the court (or the cierk 
in a jury case) in order to serve as the basis 
for enhancing a penalty pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(b)(u)( 1990)." 
From what appears to have been the prev-
ailing practice, many enhancements of the 
classification of theft pursuant to §76-6-
412(1) may have been based on unwritten 
judgments and fragmentary evidence. 
However, previously enhanced theft convict-
ions should not now be reversed or held 
invalid by our ruling, which applies only 
prospectively. See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670, 672 n.i (Utah 1989); State v. Norton, 675 
P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) cert, denied 466 U.S. 
942 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Sure 
v. Hansen, 784 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Vasilacopoulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
The enhancement of Anderson's penalty 
and the classification of his offense as a third-
degree felony are therefore reversed, and the 
case is remanded for resentencing in accord-
ance with this opinion. 
Robert L. Newey, Juage 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Cour t Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
C o d e A n n . §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1990). 
2. See Miller v. Sanford, 161 F .2d 2 9 1 , 292 (5ih Cir 
1947). 
3 . SeeSather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 1986); Sail 
Lake Cuy v. Griffin, 750 P .2d 194 (Utah Ct . 
A p p . 1988), see also 6A J. Moore & J Lucas, Moore's 
hederal Practice § 5 8 . 0 2 . 1 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; C 
Wright & A . Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure. 
§2652(1983) . 
4 . At c o m m o n taw, there was little need to intro-
duce evidence of a prior convict ion. The common 
law did not enhance penalties based on prior conv-
ict ions, and there was less need to d o so, since the 
penalty for a first offense of larceny, for example, 
was originally dea th , eliminating the possibility of it 
subsequent convict ion. R. Perkins & R. Boyce, 
Criminal Law and Procedure 174 (6th ed. 1984) 
However , m a l ime of less drastic punishments and 
a greater effort to address recidivism, there is a need 
in every proceeding to make a record that can later 
be used 10 determine whether the defendant has a 
longstanding problem in the area of the subsequent 
charge . 
Besides the need to know of previous convictions 
for later sentence enhancements , there is a need to 
be able to reliably determine whether the defendant 
has already been in jeopardy for the offense, and a 
need to keep a person 's record and reputat ion clear 
of spur ious criminal implications. 
5 . Appellate courts have often noted in cases rema-
nded for lack of findings that we cannot review a 
case on appeal if we cannot ascertain what the tn#! 
court decided. Andrus v. Baglcy. 775 P 2d 934, 93ft 
(Utah 1988); Smith v. Smith, 776 P.2d 423, 426 
(Utah 1986); see also State v tamper, 770 I>.2u 
1125 (Utah 1989); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 
1356 (Utah 1986). 
6. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 482 So 2d 587 (Fia. Ct 
A p p . 1986), Bishop v State, 176 Gd A p p 357, 335 
S .h .2d 742 (1985); State v. Suchanek, 326 N .W 2d 
263. 265 (Iowa 1982), Commonwealth v. Foster, 229 
Pa . Super . 269, 324 A 2d 538 (1974); Sta te v. Dean, 
107 Oh io A p p . 219, 158 N.E.2d 217, 224 (1958) 
(dic tum); State v. Vinson. 337 Mo 1023, 87 S.W 2d 
637, 639 (1935); State ex rel Echtle v. Card, 148 
Wash . 270, 268 P . 869(1928). 
7. Rule 81(e) provides: 
| i f Al l AHVANCI- RtPORI<< 
^AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
ENDMEKTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
3NDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
ligious and polit ical freedom., 
»ngress shall make no law respecting an estab-
nent of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
'
4of; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
**; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
md to petition the Government for a redress of 
ances, 
AMENDMENT II 
t to b e a r arms.] 
fli-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
^ of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
•^ar Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
««ering soldiers.] 
t i d i e r shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
u«?e, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
f war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
asonable s ea rches a n d seizures.] 
e right of the people to be secure in their per-
houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
^rted by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
ibing the place to be searched, and the persons 
ungs to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
jiinal act ions — Prov is ions co nce rn ing — 
Due process of law and j u s t compensa t i on 
clauses.] 
• person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
lictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
i land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
il service in time of War or public danger; nor 
any person be subject for the same oflence to be 
• put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
(1 in any criminal case to be a witness against 
olf, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
>ut due process of law; nor shall private property 
<ken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
hts of accused.] 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
lght to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
been committed, which district shall have been 
lously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com 
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence 
AMENDMENT VII 
..Trial by j u r y in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VHI 
[Bail — Punishment . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessiv-
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment? 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights re ta ined by people.) 
The enumeration in the Constant,on, of certair 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people 
AMENDMENT X 
iPowers reserved to s ta tes o r people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits aga ins t s ta tes — Restr ic t ion of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com 
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
I Election of P re s iden t and Vice-President . ] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for ae 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
422 
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on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President —The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-




1. |Slavery prohibited ] 
2. IPower to enforce amendment.; 
Section 1. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shah 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. (Power to enforce amendment . ] 




1. {Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal p r o t c 
tion.J 
2. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment i 
3 (Disqualification to hold office.J 
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid | 
(Power to enforce amendment. 1 
sec t ion i . (Cit izenship — Due p rocess of iaw — 
E q u a l protect ion.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. (Represen ta t ives — P o w e r to r e d u c e ap-
poin tment . ! 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. (Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously 
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability 
Sec. 4. (Public d e b t no t to be ques t ioned — 
Debts of t he Confederacy and claims 
not to b e paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United State-?, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay-
ment of pensions and bounties for services in sup-
pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned. But neither the United States nor any StaU1 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. (Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by BI> 
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. | Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.) 
2. IPower to enforce amendment J 
Sect ion 1. (Right of cit izens to vote — Race or 
color not to disqualify.! 
The right of citizens of the United States to votr 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. (Power to enforce amendment .} 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[ Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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ourrence of a majority of all justices of the supreme 
court. If a justice of the supreme court is disqualified 
or otherwise unable to participate in a cause before 
the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief 
justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the 
remaining justices, shall call an active judge from an 
appellate court or the district court to participate in 
the cause. 1985 
Sec. 3 [Jur isdict ion of s u p r e m e court . ] 
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction 
to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer ques-
tions of state law certified by a court of the United 
States. The supreme court shall have appellate juris-
diction over all other matters to be exercised as pro-
vided by statute, and power to issue ail writs and 
orders necessary for the exercise of the supreme 
court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of 
any cause. 1985 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of s u p r e m e cour t 
— J u d g e s p r o t e m p o r e — Regula t ion 
of p rac t i ce of law.] 
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and 
shall by rule manage the appellate process. The legis-
lature may amend the rules of procedure and evi-
dence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the legis-
lature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitu-
tion, the supreme court by rule may authorize retired 
justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform 
any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citi-
zens of the United States, Utah residents, and admit-
ted to practice law in Utah. The supreme court by 
rule shall govern the practice of law, including ad-
mission to practice law and the conduct and discipline 
of persons admitted to practice law. 1986 
Sec. 5. [ Jur i sd ic t ion of dis t r ic t cou r t a n d o ther 
cou r t s — Right of appeal . ] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or 
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided 
by statute. Except for matters filed originally with 
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an ap-
peal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to 
a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
1985 
Sec, 6. [Number of j u d g e s of disL -ourt and 
o the r c o u r t s — Division-
The number of judges of the district ^ourt and of 
other courts of record established by the legislature 
shall be provided by statute. No change in the num-
ber of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge 
from office during a judge's term of office. Geographic 
divisiors for all courts of record except the supreme 
court may be provided by statute. No change in divi-
sions shall have the effect of removing a judge from 
office during a judge's term of office. 1985 
Sec. 7. [Qualif ications of jus t i ces a n d judges . ] 
Supreme court justices shall be at least 30 years 
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five 
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice 
law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be 
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah 
residents for three years preceding selection, and ad-
mitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divi-
sions are provided for any court, judges of that court 
shall reside in the geographic division for which they 
are selected. isss 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nomina t ing commissions 
— Sena te approval . I 
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the 
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a 
list of at least three nominees certified to the gover-
nor by the judicial nominating commission having 
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fil 
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of 
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy 
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the 
supreme court shall within 20 days make the ap-
pointment from the list of nominees. The legislature 
by statute shall provide for the nominating commis-
sions' composition and procedures. No member of the 
legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the 
legislature appoint members to, any judicial nomi-
nating commission. The senate shall consider and 
render a decision on each judicial appointment within 
30 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the 
senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session 
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments. 
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a 
majority of all members of the senate. If the senate 
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be 
considered vacant and a new nominating process 
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based 
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without 
regard to any partisan political considerations. 1986 
Sec. 9. (Judicial re ten t ion elections.] 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject 
to an unopposed retention election at the first general 
election held more than three years after appoint-
ment. Following initial voter approval, each supreme 
court justice every tenth year, and each judge of other 
courts of record every sixth year, shall be subject to 
an unopposed retention election at the corresponding 
general election. Judicial retention elections shall be 
held on a nonpartisan ballot in a manner provided by 
statute. If geographic divisions are provided for any 
court of record, the judges of those courts shall stand 
for retention election only in the geographic division 
to which they are selected. 1985 
Sec. 10. [Restr ict ions on jus t ices and judges.] 
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and 
judges of all other courts of record while holding office 
may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial 
public office, or hold office in a political party. 1988 
Sec. 11. [ Judges of cou r t s not of record.] 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a 
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided 
by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed 
which requires judges of courts not of record to be 
admitted to practice law. The number of judges of 
courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 1988 
Sec. 12. [Judicial Counci l — Chief jus t i ce as ad-
minis t ra t ive officer.l 
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt 
rules for the administration of the courts of the state. 
The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice 
of the supreme court, as presiding officer, and such 
other justices, judges, and other persons as provided 
by statute. There shall be at least one representative 
on the Judicial Council from each court established 
by the constitution or by statute. The chief justice of 
the supreme court shall be the chief administrative 
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officer for the courts and shall implement the rules 
adopted by the Judicial Council. 1955 
Sec. 13. {Judicial Conduc t Commission.] 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established 
which shall investigate and conduct confidential 
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or 
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the 
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repri-
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary 
retirement of any justice or judge for the following: 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in 
office; 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a fel-
ony under state or federal law; 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial 
duties; 
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the per-
formance of judicial duties; or 
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice which brings a judicial office into disrepute. 
Prior to the implementation of any commission or-
der, the supreme court shall review the commission's 
proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may 
also permit the introduction of additional evidence. 
After its review, the supreme court shall, as it finds 
just and proper, issue its order implementing, reject-
ing, or modifying the commission's order. The Legis-
lature by statute shall provide for the composition 
and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
1985 
Sec. 14. [Compensa t ion of jus t ices and judges. ) 
The Legislature shall provide for the compensation 
of all justices and judges. The salaries of justices and 
judges shall not be diminished during their terms of 
office.
 1985 
Sec. 15. [Manda to ry re t i r ement . 1 
The Legislature may provide standards for the 




Sec. 16. 1 Pub l i c p rosecu to r s . ! 
-The Legislature shall provide for a system of public 
)f08ecutors who shall have primary responsibility for 
ihe prosecution of criminal actions brought in the 
lame of the State of Utah and shall perform such 
>ther duties as may be provided by statute. Public 
>rosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by 
itatute, and shall be admitted to practice law in 
Jtah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prose-
rute, the supreme court shall have power to appoint a 
prosecutor pro tempore. i985 
*• ARTICLE IX 
CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
APPORTIONMENT 
Section 
. {Apportionment. 1 
Number of members of Legislature] 
Renumbered.} 
iepealed.J 
ion 1. ( A p p o r t i o n m e n t ] 
v- the session next following an enumeration made 
y the authority of the United States, the Legislature 
hell divide the state into congressional, legislative, 
nd other districts accordingly. 1^9 
ec. 2. INumber of m e m b e r s of Legislature.] 
The Senate shall consist of a membership not t 
exceed twenty-nine in number, and the number •• 
representatives shall never be less than twice no 
greater than three times the number of senators 
Sec. 3. [Renumbered as Section 2 of this Ar(» 
cle.] ,9 K 




1. I Free nonsectarian schools.] 
2. [Defining what shall constitute the public schoo 
system. I 
3. I State Board of Education] 
4. [Control of higher education system by statute -
Rights and immunities confirmed.) 
5. [State School Fund and Uniform School Fund -
Establishment and use.] 
6. [Repealed.] 
7. [Proceeds of land grants constitute permancn* 
funds.] 
8. [No religious or partisan tests in schools] 
9. [Public aid to church schools forbidden I 
10. I Repealed. I 
11. [Repealed.] 
12. I Renumbered.! 
13. [Renumbered.] 
Section 1. [Free nonsec ta r i an schools.} 
The Legislature shall provide for the establishment 
and maintenance of the state's education systems in 
eluding: (a) a public education system, which shall In 
open to all children of the state; and <h) a highi-i 
education system. Both systems shall be free from 
sectarian control. >
 imi 
Sec. 2. [Defining w h a t shall cons t i tu te the pub-
lic school system.! 
The public education system shall include all pub-
lic elementary and secondary schools and such other 
schools and programs as the Legislature may desig-
nate. The higher education system shall include all 
public universities and colleges and such other insti-
tutions and programs as the Legislature may desig-
nate. Public elementary and secondary schools shall 
be free, except the Legislature may authorize the im-
position of fees in the secondary schools. ips? 
Sec. 3. [State Boa rd of Education.] 
The general control and supervision of the public 
education system shall be vested in the State Board of 
Education. The membership of the board shall be es-
tablished and elected as provided by statute. The 
State Board of Education shall appoint a State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction who shall be the exec-
utive officer of the board. i9fl7 
Sec. 4. [Control of higher educat ion system by 
s t a tu te — Rights and immunit ies con-
firmed.] 
The genera] control and supervision of the higher 
education system shall be provided for by statute. All 
rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments orig-
inally established or recognized by the constitution 
for any public university or college are confirmed. 
IPS7 
0-8-5.1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 94fc 
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
iild support, an order assigning financial responsi-
ility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
ured on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tted by the employment or training of the custodial 
»rent. If the court determines that the eircum-
ances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
ren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
der allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
ie day care for the dependent children, necessitated 
. the employment or training of the custodial par-
3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
ibsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
aintenanee of the parties, the custody of the chil-
en and their support, maintenance, health, and 
utal care, or the distribution of the property as is 
asonable and necessary. 
14) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
.tndparenta, and other relatives, the court shall 
usider the welfare of the child. 
5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
icrwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
mony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
»n the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
he remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
(io, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
ving alimony is made a party to the action of an-
Iment and his rights are determined. 
»») Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
t former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
iding with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
•A further established by the person receiving ali-
ny that that relationship or association is without 
,' sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
/) When a petition for modification of child cus-
v or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
i denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
iing party in that action, if the court determines 
i the petition was without merit and not asserted 
MKJ faith. 1B85 
t-5.1. Provision for income wi thholding in 
child suppor t o rder . 
. henever a court enters an order for child support, 
uall include in the order a provision for withhold-
mcome as a means of collecting child support aa 
tded in Chapter 45df Title 78. 1MB 
5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sex-
ual abuse — Invest igat ion. 
hen, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
nodification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
I abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
r party, the court shall order that an investiga-
te conducted by the Division of Family Services 
in the Department of Social Services in accor-
e with Part 5, Chapter 4 of Title 62A. A final 
d of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
I a report on that investigation is received by the 
t. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
uon of Family Services within 30 days of the 
f s notice and request for an investigation. isss 
6. Repealed. IBSS 
7. When decree becomes absolu te . 
e decree of divorce becomes absolute on the date 
signed by the court and entered by the clerk in 
tiie register of actions or at the expiration of a period 
of time the court may specifically designate, unless 
an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending 
or the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for 
sufficient cause otherwise orders. The court, upon ap-
plication or on its own motion for good cause shown, 
may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of 
time before the decree becomes absolute, but not to 
exceed six months from the signing and entry of the 
decree. 196& 
30-3-8. Remarr iage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves their marriage by decree may marry any per-
son other than the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affir-
mance of the decree. less 
30-3-9. Repealed. i m 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) if a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. less 
30-3-10.1. Jo in t legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody". 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
ity by the court to one parent to make specific 
decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the 
child except as specified in the order of joint legal 
custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly 
equal periods of physical custody of and access to 
the child to each of the parents, as the best inter-
est of the child often requires that a primary 
physical residence for the child be designated; 
and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying 
one parent as the primary caretaker and one 
home as the primary residence of the child, issa 
30-3-10.2. Jo in t legal custody o r d e r — Fac tors 
for cour t determinat ion — Publ ic as-
sistance. 
(1) There is a rebuttable presumption, subject to 
Subsection (2), that joint legal custody is in the best 
interest of a child. 
(2) The court may order joint legal custody if it 
determines that: 
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(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal 
custody; 
(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of 
the child; and 
(c) both parents appear capable of implement-
ing joint legal custody. 
(3) In determining the best interest of a child, the 
court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and 
emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first prior-
ity to the welfare of the child and reach shared 
decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encour-
aging and accepting a positive relationship be-
tween the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in rais-
ing the child before the filing of the suit; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of 
the parents; 
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, any 
preference of the child for or against joint legal 
custody; and 
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(4) The determination of the best interest of the 
child shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(5) The court shall inform both parties that an or-
der for joint custody may preclude eligibility for pub-
lic assistance in the form of aid to families with de-
pendent children, and that if public assistance is re-
quired for the support of children of the parties at any 
time subsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the 
order may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4. 
(6) The court may recommend that where possible 
the parties attempt to settle future disputes by a dis-
pute resolution method before seeking enforcement or 
modification of the terms and conditions of the order 
of joint legal custody through litigation, except in 
emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to 
protect the child. isss 
30-3-10.3. Terms of jo int legal custody order . 
(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide 
terms the court determines appropriate, which may 
include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, 
until altered by further order of the court, or the 
custodian who has the sole legal right to deter-
mine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange informa-
tion concerning the health, education, and wel-
fare of the child, and where possible, confer be-
fore making decisions concerning any of these 
areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regard-
ing the child's present and future physical care, 
support, and education; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the 
child's attendance at school and other activities, 
his daily routine, and his association with 
friends; and 
(e) as necessary the remaining parental rights, 
privileges, duties, and powers to be exercised by 
the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the 
order the terms agreed to between the parties. 
(3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed 
by the court order may be exercised by the parent 
having physical custody of the child, the majority of 
the time. 
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(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians? 
does not impair or limit the authority of the court .r 
to order support of the child, including payments ) 
by one custodian to the other. 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is 
not grounds for modifying a support order. 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resolu-
tion procedure the parties agree to use before seeking 
enforcement or modification of the terms and condi-
tions of the order of joint legal custody through litiga-
tion, except in emergency situations requiring ex 
parte orders to protect the child. i988 
30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal 
custodians the court may, after a hearing, modify an 
order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or 
both custodians have materially and substan-
tially changed since the entry of the order to be 
modified, or the order has become unworkable or 
inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions 
of the decree would be an improvement for and in 
the best interest of the child. 
(2) (a) The order of joint legal custody is termi-
nated upon the filing of a motion for termination 
by: 
(i) both parents; or 
(ii) one parent, when notice of the motion 
is sent by certified mail to the other parent 
and an affidavit is filed with the motion, in-
dicating the motion has been mailed as re-
quired by this subsection, 
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be re-
placed by the court with an order of sole legal 
custody under Section 30-3-10. All related issues, 
including visitation and child support, shall also 
be determined and ordered by the court. 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this sec-
tion is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner 
designed to harass the other party, the court shall 
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending 
party. um 
30-3-10.5. Paymen t s of suppor t , maintenance , 
and alimony. 
Unless the order or decree providing for support, 
maintenance, or alimony under this chapter or Chap-
ter 4, Title 30, provides a different time for payment, 
all monthly payments of support, maintenance, or ali-
mony provided for in the order or decree shall be due 
one-half by the 5th day of each month, and the re-
maining one-half by the 20th day of that month. i»&s 
30-3-10.6. Paymen t u n d e r child suppor t o rder 
— J u d g m e n t . 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal 
support under any child support order, as defined by 
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it 
is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and 
effect of any judgment of a district court, except 
as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and 
credit in this and in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by 
this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided 
in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a 
child support order may be modified with respect to 
any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition 
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was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the peti-
tioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the peti-
tioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" 
means a state or political subdivision, a territory or 
possession of the United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), 
to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the 
real property interest of any third party relying on 
the public record, shall be docketed in the district 
court in accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and 
S2A-11-311. 1IMM> 
30-3-11. Repealed. i l&si 
30-3-11.1. Family Cour t Act — Purpose . 
It is the public policy of the state of Utah to 
strengthen the family life foundation of our society 
and reduce the social and economic costs to the state 
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable 
measures to preserve marriages, particularly where 
minor children are involved. The purposes of this act 
are to protect the rights of children and to promote 
the public welfare by preserving and protecting fam-
ily life and the institution of matrimony by providing 
the courts with further assistance for family counsel-
ing, the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable 
settlement of domestic and family controversies. 1868 
30-3-11.2. Appointment of counse l for child. 
If, in any action before any court of this state in-
volving the custody or support of a child, it shall ap-
pear in the best interests of the child to have a sepa-
rate exposition of the issues and personal representa-
tion for the child, the court may appoint counsel to 
represent the child throughout the action, and the 
attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as 
a cost of the action. 1868 
30-3-12. Courts to exercise family counsel ing 
powers . 
Each district court of the respective judicial dis-
tricts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, 
separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and 
support in connection therewith, child custody in ha-
beas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise 
the family counseling powers conferred by this act 
IMS 
30-3-13. Repealed. mi 
30-3-13.1. Es tabl ishment of family cour t divi-
sion of distr ict cour t . 
A family court division of the district court may be 
established with the consent of the county cpmmia-
sion in a county in which the district court deter-
mines that the social conditions in the county and the 
number of domestic relations cases in the courts re-
quire use of the procedures provided for in this act in 
order to give full and proper consideration to such 
cases and to effectual the purposes of this act. The 
determination shall be made annually by the judge of 
iha district court in counties having only one judge, 
and by a majority of the judges of the district court in 
counties having more than one judge. issw 
30-3-14. Repealed. ;t*» 
30-3-14.1. Designation of judges — Terms . 
In a county within a judicial district having more 
than one judge of the district court but having a popu-
lation of leas than 300,000 and in which the district 
court has established a family court division, the pre-
siding judge of audi court shall annually, in the 
month of September, designate at least one judge to 
hear all cases under this act. In a county within a 
judicial district having more than one judge of the 
district court and having a population of more than 
300,000 and in which the district court has estab-
lished a family court division, the presiding judge of 
such court shall annually, in the month of September, 
designate at least two judges to hear all cases under 
this act, and shall designate one of such judges as the 
presiding judge of such family court division. Such 
judge or judges shall serve on the family court divi-
sion not less than one year and devote their time 
primarily to divorce and other domestic relations 
cases, i96s 
30-3-15. Repealed. issi 
30-3-15,1. Appointment of domestic relat ions 
counselors, family cour t commis-
sioner, and ass is tants and clerks. 
In each county having a population of less than 
300,000 and in which the district court has estab-
lished a family court division the district court judge 
or judges may, and in each county having a popula-
tion of more than 300,000 and in which the district 
court has established a family court division the dis-
trict court judges shall, by an order filed in the office 
of the clerk on or before July 1 of each yoar, appoint 
one or more domestic relations counselors, an attor-
ney of recognized ability and standing at the bar as 
family court commissioner, and such other persons as 
assistants and clerks as may be necessary, to serve 
during the pleasure of the appointing power. im» 
30-3-15.2. Domestic re la t ions counselors — 
Powers . 
Domestic relations counselors shall have the power 
to; 
(1) Hold conciliation conferences with persona 
who are parties to a petition for conciliation and 
with parties in actions for divorce, annulment or 
separate maintenance who may be referred by 
the court in such actions. 
(2) Test and evaluate all persons coming be-
fore them and either hold further conferences 
with them or refer them to agencies or resources 
for further conferences and counseling. Domestic 
relations counselors shall report to the court on 
each case referred, advising as to the number of 
conferences attended by the parties and whether 
a reconciiiulion has been or is likely to be ef-
fected. 
(3) Conduct investigations and make reports 
as the court may direct regarding the award of 
custody or placement of children, either in pre-
divorce or post-divorce matters. When a request 
for an investigation has been joined in or agreed 
to by both parties a report ahull be filed with the 
court and received as evidence, subject to the 
right of either party to cross-examine the person 
making the report. 
(4) Keep records, compile statistics and make 
reports as the court may direct. iyes 
30-3-15.3. Commissioners — Powers . 
Family court commissioners shall have power to: 
(1) Secure compliance with court orders. 
(2) Serve as judge pro tempore, master or ref-
eree on assignment of the court, and with the 
written consent of the parties to hear orders to 
show cause where no contempt is alleged, default 
divorces where the parties huve had marriage 
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counseling but there has been no reconciliation, 
uncontested actions under the Uniform Act on 
Puternity, actions under the Uniform Civil Lia-
bility for Support Act and actions under the Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
(3) Represent the interest of children in di-
vorce or annulment actions, and of the parties in 
appropriate cases. 
(4) Act with the domestic relations counselors 
in the screening and referral of applicants for 
counseling. 
(5) Assist the domestic relations counselors in 
custody investigations and the presentation, 
where necessary, of their reports to the court. 
1868 
30-3-15.4. Salar ies and expenses . 
Salaries of persons appointed under the foregoing 
sections shall be fixed by the board of commissioners 
of the county in which they serve. Office space, fur-
nishings, equipment and supplies for family court 
commissioners and conciliation staff shall be pro-
vided by the board of county commissioners. The ex-
penses and salaries of family court commissioners 
and conciliation staff shall be paid from county funds 
under Section 17-16-7. 18S8 
30-3-16. Repealed. iwn 
30-3-16.1. Jur i sd ic t ion of family cour t division 
— Powers . 
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses 
which may, unless a reconciliation is achieved, result 
m the dissolution or annulment of the marriage or in 
the disruption of the household, and there is a child of 
the spouses or either of them under the age of 17 
years whose welfare might be affected, the family 
court division of the district court shall have jurisdic-
tion over the controversy, over the parties and over 
all persons having any relation to the controversy 
and may compel attendance before the court or a do-
mestic relations counselor of the parties or other per-
sons related to the controversy. The court may make 
orders in divorce or conciliation proceeding as it 
deems necessary for the protection of the family in-
terests. 18S8 
30-3-16.2. Peti t ion for conciliation. 
Prior to the filing of any action for divorce, annul-
ment, or separate maintenance, either spouse or both 
spouses may file a petition for conciliation in the fam-
ily court division invoking the jurisdiction of the 
court for the purpose of preserving the marriage by 
effecting a reconciliation between the parties or an 
amicable settlement of the controversy between them 
so as to avoid litigation over the issues involved, isae 
30-3-16.3. Contents of petition. 
The petition for conciliation shall state: 
(1) A controversy exists between the spouses 
and request the aid of the court to effect a recon-
ciliation or an amicable settlement of the contro-
versy. 
(2) The name and age of each child under the 
age of 17 years whose welfare may be affected by 
the controversy, . 
* (3) The name and address of the petitioner or 
the names and addresses of the petitioners. 
(4) If the petition is filed by one spouse only, 
the name and address of the other spouse as a 
respondent. 
(5) The name, as a respondent, of any other 
person who has any relation to the controvert 
and, if known to the peuuoners, the address « 
such person. 
(6) Such other information as the court may \, 
rule require. i& 
30-3-16.4. P rocedure upon filing of petition. 
When a petition for conciliation is filed in the fan 
ily court division of the district court, the court shu 
refer the matter to the domestic relations counsel 
or counselors and shall cause notice to be given to tl 
spouses, by mail or in a form prescribed by the com 
of the filing of the petition and of the time and pie. 
of any hearing, conference or other proceeding sche< 
uled by the court or domestic relations counselors vn 
der this act. 10 
30-3-16.5. Fees. 
The court may fix fees to be charged for filing 
petition for conciliation and for use of the couri 
counseling services. it> 
30-3-16.6. Information not avai lable to publi. 
Neither the names of petitioners nor respondent 
nor the contents of petitions for conciliation filed u 
der this act, shall be available or open to public i 
quiry, except that an attorney for a person seeking 
file an action for divorce, annulment or separa 
maintenance may determine from the clerk of tl 
court if the other spouse has filed a petition for cone 
iution. iu 
30-3-16.7. Effect of peti t ion — Pendency of a 
tion. 
The filing of a petition for conciliation under th 
act shall, for a period of 60 days thereafter, act as 
bar to the filing by either spouse of an action for c 
vorce, annulment of marriage or separate main! 
nance unless the court otherwise orders. The pu-
dency of an action for divorce, annulment of marriu, 
or separate maintenance shall not prevent eilh 
party to the action from filing a petition for concih 
tion under this act, either on his own or at the ruqu*. 
ancf direction of the court as authorized by Sectu 
30-3-17; and the filing of a petition for conciliate 
shall stay for a period of 60 days, unless the con 
otherwise orders, any trial or default hearing up< 
the complaint. However, when the judge of the fami 
court division is advised in writing by a marria? 
counselor to whom a petition for conciliation has be« 
referred that a reconciliation of the parties cannot i 
effected, the bar to filing an action or the stay of in 
or default hearing shall be removed. . n. 
30-3-17. Power and jur isdict ion of judge . 
The judge of a district court may counsel eith 
spouse or both and may in his discretion require QI 
or both of them to appear before him and, in thu 
counties where a domestic relations counselor h 
been appointed pursuant to this act, require them 
file a petition for conciliation and to appear befu 
such counselor, or may recommend the aid of a phyi 
cian, psychiatrist, psychologist, social service work 
or other specialists or scientific expert, or the p$u$U 
bishop or presiding officer of any religious denomin 
tion to which the parties may belong. The power at 
jurisdiction granted by this act shall bo in addition 
that presently exercised by the district courts ai 
shall not be in limitation thereof. it> 
30-3-17.1. Proceedings deemed confidential 
Written evaluation by counselor . 
The petition for conciliation and all communic 
tions, verbal or written, from the parties to the ti 
meatic relations counselors or other personnel of ti 
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37* ' Agreement to pay compensa t ion to re-
<cov«r reported property unenforce-
able. 
lgreements to pay compensation to recover or 
in the recovery of property reported under Sec-
^-44-18, made within 24 months after the date 
nt or delivery is made under Section 78-44-20, 
enforceable. 1983 
t8. P rope r ty in foreign coun t ry or from 
foreign t r ansac t ion exempt . 
chapter does not apply to any property held in 
,*n country and arising out of a foreign transac-
1983 
19. Duties u n d e r p r i o r law — P r o p e r t y to 
be included in init ial r epo r t . 
his chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty 
rt, pay, or deliver property arising before July 
\ Such holder who fails to comply before that 
subject to the applicable enforcement and pen-
ovisions in existence at tha t time and those 
ons are continued in effect for the purpose of 
ibsection, subject to Subsection 78-44-30(2). 
I'he initial report to be filed under this chapter 
perty that was not required to be reported be-
»ly 1, 1983, but which is subject to this chapter 
nclude all items of property that would have 
resumed abandoned during the ten-year period 
o July 1, 1983, as if this chapter had been in 
luring that period. 1983 
tO. Appl icat ion and cons t ruc t ion of c h a p -
ter . 
chapter shall be applied and construed as to 
•ite its general purpose to make uniform the 
Ih respect to the subject of this chapter among 
- nactmg it. 1983 
C H A P T E R 45 
)RM CIVIL LIABILITY F O k S - . P P U R " 
ACT 
I. Short title. 
i. Definitions. 
*. Duty of man. 
1. Duty of woman 
l 1. Duty of stepparent to support stepchild 
— Effect of termination of marriage or 
common law relationship. 
* 2. Natural or adoptive parent has primary 
obligation of support — Right of atep-
parent to recover support. 
I 3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to 
support. 
r>. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or 
residence of obligee, 
fj. District court jurisdiction 
7. Determination of amount of support — 
Rebuttable guidelines. 
7.1. Medical and dental expenses of depen-
dent children — Assigning rpqpnnu-
bility for payment — Insurance cover-
age 
7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal 
7.3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipula-
tion. 
7 4, Obligation — Adjusted gross income 
used. 
7 fi Determination of «ross income — 1«* 
puted income. 
Section 
78-45-7.6 Adjusted gross income. 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations. 
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation cal-
culations. 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
78-45-7.12 Income in excess of tables. 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and 
functions. 
78-45-7.14 Child support obligation table. 
78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insur-
ance. ^ 
78-45-7.16. Uninsured extraordinary expenses — 
Expenses not incurred. 
"8-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support or-
dered. 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
78-45-9.1. Repealed. 
78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
78-45-10. Appeals. 
78-45-11 Husband and wife privileged communi-
cation inapplicable — Competency of 
spouses. 
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently 
existing. 
78-45-13 Interpretation and construction 
78-45-1. Shor t title. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability 
for Support Act. 1957 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income cal-
culated under Subsection 78-45-7 6(1) 
(2) "Base child support award" means the 
award calculated using the guidelines before ad-
ditions for uninsured extraordinary medical ex-
penses and work-related child care costs. 
(3) "Base combined child support obligation ta-
ble," "child support table," or "table" means the 
table in Section 78-45-7 14. 
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter under the 
age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living 
and without sufficient means. 
(5) "Earnings" means compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denomi-
nated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise, and specifically include periodic pay-
ment pursuant to pension or retirement pro-
grams, or insurance policies of any type. Earn-
ings shall specifically include all gain derived 
from capital, from labor, or from both combined, 
including profit gained through sale or conver-
sion of capital assets. 
(6) "Extraordinary medical expense" includes 
medical and dental expenses for surgery, orth-
odontic care, psychological or psychiatric care, 
hospitalization, physical therapy, opthalmology 
and optometry, broken limbs, and continuing ill-
nesses or allergies such as diabetes or asthma. 
(7) "Guidelines" means the child support 
guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2 through 
78-45-7.18. 
(8) "Joint physical custody" means the child 
ptays with each parent overnight for more than 
25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
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the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support. 
(9) "Obligee" means any person to whom a 
duty of support is owed 
(10) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty 
of support. 
(11) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an 
adoptive parent, or a stepparent. 
(12) "Split custody" means that each parent 
has physical custody of a t least one of the chil-
dren. 
(13) "State" includes any state, territory or 
possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. 
(14) "Stepchild" means any child with a step-
parent. 
(15) "Stepparent" means a person ceremoni-
ally married to a child's natural or adoptive cus-
todial parent who is not the child's natural or 
adoptive parent or one living with the natural or 
adoptive parent as a common law spouse, whose 
common law marriage was entered into in a state 
which recognizes the validity of common law 
marriages. 
(16) "Total child support award" means the 
base child support award, plus any uninsured ex-
traordinary medical expenses and child care 
costs that may be ordered. 
(17) "Work-related child care costs" means 
reasonable child care costs for up to a full-time 
work week or training schedule, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial par-
ent, as provided in Section 78-45-7.17. 1989 
78-45-3. Duty of m a n . 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall 
support his wife when she is in need. 1977 
78-45-4. Duty of woman . 
Every woman shall support her child, ana she shall 
support her husband when he is in need 1957 
78-45-4.1. Duty of s t e p p a r e n t to s u p p o r t s tep-
child — Effect of t e rmina t ion of mar -
r iage or common l aw re la t ionsh ip . 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to 
support a child. Provided, however, that upon the ter-
mination of the marriage or common law relationship 
between the stepparent and the child's natural or 
adoptive parent the support obligation shall termi-
nate. 1980 
78-45-4.2. N a t u r a l or adopt ive p a r e n t h a s pri-
m a r y obl igat ion of s u p p o r t — Righ t of 
s t e p p a r e n t to r ecover suppor t . 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the 
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary obli-
gation of support, furthermore, a stepparent has the 
same right to recover support for a stepchild from the 
natural or adoptive parent as any other obligee. 1979 
78-45-4.3. Ward of s ta te — P r i m a r y obligat ion to 
suppor t . 
Notwithstanding Section 78-45-2, a natural or an 
adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child has 
become a ward of the state is not relieved of the pri-
mary obligation to support that child until he reaches 
the age of majority. 1983 
78-45-5. Duty of obligor r ega rd le s s of p re sence 
or res idence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state ha? th*-
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of the 
presence or residence of the obligee. 195? 
78-45-6. Distr ict cou r t jur isdic t ion . 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of ail pro-
ceedings brought under this act. 195? 
78-45-7. De te rmina t ion of a m o u n t of s u p p o r t — 
Rebu t t ab l e guidel ines . 
(1) Prospective support shall be pqual to th^ 
imount granted by prior court order unless there has 
been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court de-
termining the amount of prospective support shal* 
require each party to file a proposed award of child 
support using the guidelines before an order award-
ing child support or modifying an existing award may 
be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut 
the guidelines, the court shall establish support after 
considering all relevant factors including but not lim-
ited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the par-
ties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn. 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn, 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and 
the child; 
(0 the ages of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the sup-t 
port of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court 
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon, 
but not limited to 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by 
the obligee, if any; and 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in support of spouse and 
children. 1989 
-» 45-7.1. Medical a n d denta l expenses of de-
p e n d e n t chi ldren — Assigning respon-
sibility for p a y m e n t — I n s u r a n c e cov-
e rage . 
When no prior court order exists or the prior court 
order makes no specific provision for the payment of 
medical and dental expenses for dependent children, 
the court shall include in its order a provision assign-
ing responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses for the depen-
dent children If coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, the court may also include a provision requiring 
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, 
hospital, and dental care insurance for those children 
1984 
78-45-7.2. Appl ica t ion of guidel ines — Rebut ta l . 
(1) (a) The guidelines apply to any judicial or ad-
ministrative order establishing or modifying an 
award of child support entered on or after July 1, 
1989. 
(b) Neither the enactment of the guidelines or 
any consequent impact of the guidelines on exist-
ing child support orders constitute a substantial 
or material change of circumstances as a ground 
for modification of a court order existing prior to 
July 1, 1989. However, if the the court finds a 
material change of circumstances independent of 
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»rf the guidelines, the guidelines may be applied to 
f
 modify a court order existing prior to July 1, 
1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be ap-
plied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing 
or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support, 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the pro-
visions and considerations required by the guide-
lines and the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of 
this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the 
record supporting the conclusion that complying with 
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be 
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a 
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) A noncustodial parent's obligation to pro 
vide child support for natural born or adopted 
children of a second family arising subsequent to 
entry of an existing child support order may not 
be considered to lower the child support awarded 
to the first family in the existing order. 
(b) If the custodial parent of the first family 
petitions to increase child support, all natural 
born and adopted children of the noncustodial 
parent may be considered in determining 
whether to increase the award. u»sf» 
78-45-7.3, P r o c e d u r e — Documenta t ion — Stiff 
ula t ion. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, tl•«-
moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Sub-
section 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) an affidavit indicating that the amount of 
child support requested is consistent with th*» 
guidelines, or that the amount is not consistent 
with the guidelines. -w 
(2) (a) If the documental ion of income required un-
der Subsection (J) is not available, a verified rep-
resentation of the defaulting party's income by 
the moving party, based on the best evidence 
available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and 
may only be offered after a copy has been pro 
vided to the defaulting party in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) If a stipulation is submitted as a basis for 
establishing or modifying child support, each 
parent shall present financial verification re-
quired by Subsection 78-45-7.5(4) and an affida-
vit fully disclosing the financial s tatus of each 
parent, as required for use of the guidelines. A 
hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall 
be used to review the adequacy of a child support 
order negotiated by the parents. 
(b) A stipulated amount for child support or 
combined child support and alimony is adequate 
under the guidelines if the stipulated child sup-
port amount or combined amount exceeds the 
total child support award required by the guide-
lines. When the stipulated amount exceeds the 
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding 
under Section 78-45-7.2. IPS9 
8-46-7.4. Obligation 
used. 
Adjusted g ross income 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating 
each parent's share of the child support award. Onlj 
income of the natural or adoptive parents of the chile 
may be used to determine the award under these 
guidelines. \m 
78-45-7.5. Determinat ion of g ross income — Im-
puted income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" in-
cludes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, in-
cluding nonearned sources, except under Subsec-
tion (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, 
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, 
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, inter-
est, trust income, alimony from previous mar-
riages, annuities, capital gains, social security 
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, disability insurance 
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" 
government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited 
to the equivalent of one full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy 
program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits 
received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or oper-
ation of a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-
employment or business operation from gross re-
ceipts. The income and expenses from self-em-
ployment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award. Only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this sub-
section may differ from the amount of business 
income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be 
computed on an annual basis and then recalcu-
lated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable docu-
mentation of current earnings, including year-to-
date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current 
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least 
the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income 
from nonearned sources according to the source. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be 
used to determine whether an underemployment 
or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the 
parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent un-
less the parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed. 
(b) Income shall be imputed to a parent based 
upon employment potential and probable earn-
ings as derivea from work history, occupation 
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qualifications, and prevailing earnings for per-
sons of similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, in-
come shall be imputed at least at the federal min-
imum wage for a forty-hour work week. To im-
pute a greater income, the judge in a judicial pro-
ceeding or the presiding officer in an administra-
tive proceeding shall enter specific findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputa-
tion. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the 
following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents ' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally dis-
abled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occu-
pational training to establish basic job skills, 
or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs 
of a child require the custodial parent's pres-
ence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may. not include the earnings 
of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
<b) Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited 
as child support to the parent upon whose earn-
ing record it is based, by crediting the amount 
against the potential obligation of that parent. 
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
ered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. IBSB 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in-
come" is the amount calculated by subtracting from 
^ross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
md child support previously ordered. 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
upport award by adjusting the gross incomes of the 
>arents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ng. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider 
hat in determining the child support, the guidelines 
o not provide a deduction from gross income for ali-
l ony . 1989 
8-45-7.7. Calcula t ion of obl igat ions . 
(1) The parents* child support obligation shall be 
ivided between them in proportion to their aajusted 
ross incomes. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and 
)!it custody as d<4fined in Section 78-45-2, the total 
lild support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table; 
(b) calculate each parent's proportionate share 
of the base combined child support obligation by 
multiplying the combined child support obliga-
tion by each parent's percentage of combined ad-
justed gross income, and subtracting from the 
products the children's portion of any monthly 
payments made directly by each parent for medi-
cal and dental insurance premiums; 
(c) allocate any known uninsured extraordi 
nary medical expenses to be incurred on behalf o' 
the children equally to each parent; 
(d) after subtracting federal tax credits, alio 
cate monthly work-related child care cost 
equally to each parent; 
(e) calculate the total child support award lv 
adding the noncustodial parent's share o( th< 
base child support obligation calculated in Sub 
section (2Kb) and the two amounts allocated b 
Subsections (2)(c) and (d); and include in the oi 
der all three amounts and the total child suppor' 
award. 
(3) The base combined child support obligation tn 
ble provides" combined child support obligations for ui 
to six children. For more than six children, ndditionn 
amounts shall be added to the base child support obit 
gation shown. The amount shown on the table is th< 
support amount for the total number of children, n<> 
an amount per child. 19*» 
78-45-7.8. Spli t cus tody — Obligat ion calcula-
t ions . 
In cases of split custody, the total child supp«" 
award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the aajusted gross incomes of th 
parents and determine the base combined chil< 
support obligation using the base child suppoi 
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calcn 
lated amount between the parents in proportim 
to the number of children for whom ench pnren' 
has physical custody. The amounts so calculate" 
are a tentative base child support obligation du 
each parent from the other parent for support c> 
the child or children for whom each parent ha 
physical custody. 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child suppor' 
obligation due each parent by the percentag< 
that the other parent's adjusted gross incom-
bears to the total combined adjusted gross incom* 
of both parents. 
'3) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
(2? the children's portion of any monthly pay 
merits made directly by each parent for modioli 
and dental insurance premiums. 
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection 
(3) from the larger amount to determine the bas« 
child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 
(5) Allocate any known uninsured extraordi 
nary medical expenses to be incurred on behalf o< 
the children equally to each parent. 
(6) After subtracting federal tax credits, alio 
cate combined monthly work-related child can 
costs equally to each parent. 
(7) Calculate the total child support award b\ 
adding the base child support award calculated 
in Subsection (4) and the amounts allocated ii-
Subsections <5) and ((>). Include all three amount 
and the total child support award in the chil«l 
support order. imv 
78-45-7.9. J o i n t physical cus tody — Obligation 
ca lcu la t ions . 
In cases of joint physical custody, the total child 
support award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of th-
parents and determine the base combined chil< 
support obligation using the base child suppoi 
obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportional* 
share of the base combined child support obliga 
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< tion by multiplying the combined child support 
*}•* '-obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross income. The amounts so cal-
* culated are a tentative base child support obliga-
tion due from each parent for support of the chil-
dren. 
' (3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child 
» support obligation by the percentage of time the 
children spend with the other parent to deter-
mine each parent's tentative obligation to the 
other parent. 
(4) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
(3) the children's portion of any monthly pay-
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums. 
(5) Calculate the base child support award to 
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser 
amount calculated in Subsection (4) from the 
larger amount. 
(6) Allocate any known uninsured extraordi-
nary medical expenses to be incurred on behalf of 
the children equally to each parent. 
(7) After subtracting federal tax credits, allo-
cate the combined work-related child care costs of 
the parents equally to each parent to obtain the 
other parent's tentative child care obligation. 
(8) (a) Calculate the total child support award 
that the parent determined to be the obligor 
in Subsection (5) must pay when the obligee 
has physical custody by: 
(i) adding the base child support 
award calculated under Subsection (5); 
(ii) adding the amount of known unin-
sured extraordinary medical expenses 
allocated to the obligor in Subsection (6); 
and 
(iii) adding the amount of the child 
care obligation allocated to the obligor 
in Subsection (7). 
(b) Calculate the total child support award 
that the parent determined to be the obligor 
in Subsection (5) must pay when that parent 
has physical custody by: 
(i) adding the base child support 
award calculated under Subsection (5); 
(ii) adding the amount of the known 
uninsured extraordinary medical ex-
penses allocated to the obligor in Sub-
section (6); and 
(iii) subtracting the amount of the 
child care obligation allocated to the ob-
ligee in Subsection (7). 
(9) Include the amounts determined in Subsec-
tions (8)(a) and (8Kb) and the two total child sup-
port awards in the child support order. 1989 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base 
combined child support award is automatically re-
duced to reflect the lower base combined child sup-
port obligation shown in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless other-
wise provided in the child support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child 
amount derived from the base child support award 
originally ordered. less 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visi tat ion. 
(I) The child support order shall provide that the 
base child support award be reduced by 50% for each 
child for time periods during which specific extended 
visitation for that child is granted in the order for at 
least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. Only the base 
child support award is affected by the 50% abate-
ment. The amount added to the base child support 
award for uninsured extraordinary medical expenses 
may continue uninterrupted. The amount to be paid 
for work-related child care costs may be suspended if 
the costs are not incurred during the extended visita-
tion. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child 
amount to which the abatement applies shall be cal-
culated by dividing the base child support award by 
the number of children included in the award. 1989 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables . ,^ 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate 
and just child support amount may be ordered, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children 
due support. 1989 
78-45-7.13. Advisory commit tee — Membership 
and functions. 
(1) On or before May 1, 1989 and May 1, 1991, and 
then on or before May 1 of every fourth year subse-
quently, the governor shall appoint an advisory com-
mittee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the 
Office of Recovery Services; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the 
Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the 
Utah State Bar Association; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, 
not to exceed five, who represent diverse inter-
ests related to child support issues, as the gover-
nor may consider appropriate. However, none of 
the individuals appointed under this subsection 
may be members of the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion. 
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the 
child support guidelines to ensure their applica-
tion results in the determination of appropriate 
child support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legisla-
tive Judiciary Interim Committee on or before 
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or be-
fore October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee*8 report shall include recom-
mendations of the majority of the committee, as 
well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(3) The committee members serve without compen-
sation. Staff for the committee shall be provided from 
the existing budgets of the Department of Social Ser-
vices and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases 
to exist no later than the date the subsequent com-
mittee under this section is appointed. 1989 
78-45-7.14. Child suppor t obligation table. 
The following is the Base Combined Child Support 
Obligation Table: 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION 
(Both Parents) 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Less 
than $200 $20 $28 $30 $31 $32 $33 
200 23 34 35 35 36 36 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































78-45-7.15. Medical and denta l expenses — In-
su rance . 
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance 
premiums for children are included in the base com-
bined child support obligation table. 
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not 
included in the table. The child support order shall 
require: 
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured rou-
tine medical and dental expenses, including rou-
tine office visits, physical examinations, and im-
munizations; and 
(b) both parents to share equally all other rea-
sonable and necessary uninsured medical and 
dental expenses. 
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both par-
ents at a reasonable cost and the children would 
gain more complete coverage by doing so, both 
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance 
for the dependent children. 
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents 
at a reasonable cost or if no advantage to the 
children's coverage would result, the parent who 
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be 
ordered to maintain that insurance. 198» 
78-45-7.16. Uninsured ex t raord ina ry expenses 
— Expenses not incurred . 
(1) (a) The monthly amount of all known reason-
able and necessary uninsured extraordinary 
medical expenses and the monthly amount to be 
paid in addition to the base child support award 
for reasonable work-related child care costs actu-
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ally incurred on behalf of the dependent children 
of the parents shall be specified as two separate 
monthly amounts in the order 
(b) If an actual expense included in an amount 
specified in the order ceases to be incurred, the 
obligor may suspend making monthly payment 
of that expense while it is not being incurred, 
without obtaining a modification of the child sup-
port order 
(2) Unless the expenses described in Subsection (1) 
are included in the child support order, or the parents 
enter into a written agreement to share the expenses, 
one parent may not obligate both parents to pay the 
expenses 1989 
78-45-7.17. Child ca re costs . 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child 
support order is presumed if the custodial parent is 
working and actually incurring the child care costs 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not pre-
sumed, but may be awarded on a case by case basis if 
the costs are related to the career or occupational 
training of the custodial parent 1989 
78-45-7.18. Limitation on a m o u n t of suppo r t or-
dered . 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child 
support award that may be ordered using the base 
combined child support obligation table or for the 
iward of uninsured extraordinary medical expenses 
except under Subsection (2) 
(2) If the combination of the two amounts under 
Subsection (1) exceeds 50% of the obligor's aajusted 
(,'ross income, or that by adding the child care costs, 
'he total child support award would exceed 50% of the 
obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption un-
ler Section 78-45-7 17 is rebutted 1989 
78-45-8. Cont inuing jur isdic t ion. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or va-
' ate the order of support where justice requires 1957 
78-45-9. Enforcement of r ight of suppor t . 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor, and the office may proceed 
pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable 
statute, either on behalf of the Department of 
Social Services or any other department or 
agency of this state that provides public assis-
tance, as defined by Subsection f)2A 11-303(3), to 
enforce the right to recover public assistance, or 
on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's 
right of support against the obligor 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced 
by the office to enforce payment of the obligor's 
support obligation, it shall be the duty of the at-
torney general or the county attorney of the 
county of residence of the obligee to represent the 
office 
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or 
file a pleading to establish or modify a support 
obligation or to recover support due or owing, 
whether under this chapter or any other applica-
ble statute, without filing an affidavit with the 
court at the time the action is commenced or the 
pleading is filed stating whether public assis-
tance has been or is being provided on behalf of a 
dependent child of the person commencing the 
action or filing the pleading 
(b) If public assistance has been or is being 
provided, that person shall join the office as a 
party to the action The office shall be repre-
sented as provided in Subsection (1Kb) 
(3) As used in this section "office" means the Office 
of Recovery Services within the Department of Social 
Services im» 
78-45-9.1. Repealed. I»M 
78-45-9.2. County a t to rney to assist obligee. 
The county attorney's office shall provide assis-
tance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act 
in the following manner 
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial 
Council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment 
if the obligee is not represented by legal counsel, 
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a 
fee not to exceed $25 for providing assistance to 
an obligee under Subsection (1) 
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file lmpe-
cuniously if the obligee is unable to bear the ex-
penses of the action and assist the obligee with 
such filing, 
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods 
for service of process, and 
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously schedul-
ing a hearing before the court 1983 
78-45-10. Appeals . 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments 
under this act as in other civil actions 1957 
78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged commu-
nication inappl icable — Competency 
of spouses. 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of 
communications between husband and wife are inap-
plicable under this act Spouses are competent wit-
nesses to testify to any relevant matter, including 
marriage and parentage 1967 
78-45-12. Rights a re in addi t ion to those pres-
ently existing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not 
in substitution to any other rights 1967 
78-45-13. In terpreta t ion and construct ion. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the 
law of those states which enact it 1067 
CHAPTER 45a 
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Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title 
Operation of act 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
The father of a child which is or may be born out of 
399 JUDICIAL CODE 78-45a-13 
wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a 
child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is 
born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's 
pregnancy and confinement and for the education, 
necessary support and funeral expenses of the child 
A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a 
married woman by a man other than her husband 
1965 
P8-45a-2 Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of 
he mother, child, or the public authority chargeable 
>y law with the support of the child If paternity has 
een determined or has been acknowledged according 
5 the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father 
lay be enforced in the same or other proceedings 
(1) by the mother child, or the public author-
ity which have furnished or may furnish the rea-
sonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, ed-
ucation, necessary support, or funeral expenses, 
and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies 
to the extent that they have furnished the rea-
sonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, ed-
ucation, necessary support, or funeral expenses 
1966 
-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the fa-
ther . 
The father's liability for past education and neces-
sary support are limited to a period of four years next 
preceding the commencement of an action 1965 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father 's 
es ta te . 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabili 
ties under this act are limited to amounts accrued 
prior to his death and such sums as may be payable 
for dependency under other laws 1965 
78-45a-5. Remedies . 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action 
under this act and all remedies for the enforcement of 
judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
ment for a wife or for education, necessary support, or 
funeral expenses for legitimate children apply The 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke 
a judgment for future education and necessary sup-
port All remedies under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, are available for enforce-
ment of duties of support under this act 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
igamst the obligor and the state Department of So-
cial Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or 
n its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chap 
er 45b of this title to enforce that right of support 
igainst the obligor In such actions by the depart-
nent, ail the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title 
shall be equally applicable to this chapter Whenever 
a court action is commenced bv the state Department 
of Social Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney 
general or the county attorney, of the county of resi-
dence of the obligee, to represent that department 
1975 
78-45a-6. Time of trial . 
If the issue of paternity is raised in action com-
menced during the pregnancy of the mother, the trial 
shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be 
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during 
such delay testimony may be perpetuated according 
to the laws of this state 1965 
78-45a-6.5. Pa t e rn i ty act ion — J u r y trial . 
(1) Either party to an action commenced under this 
chapter may demand a jury trial to determine pater-
nity 
(2) (a) The procedure and law governing a trial by 
jury under this chapter is the same as for a civil 
jury trial in district court 
(b) The standard of proof is "by a preponder 
ance of the evidence " 198S 
78-45a-7. Author i ty for blood tests . 
The court, upon its own initiative or upon sugges-
tion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood 
is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the 
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceed 
ings unduly, "hall order the mother, child and alleged 
father to submit to blood tests If any party refuses to 
submit to such tests the court may resolve the ques-
tion of paternity against such party or enforce its or-
der if the rights of others and the interests of justice 
so require iww 
78-45a-8. Selection of exper t s . 
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as ex-
aminers of blood types who shall be appointed by the 
court The experts shall be called by the court as wit-
nesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject 
to cross-examination by the parties Anv party or per-
son at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered 
may demand that other experts qualified as exam 
mers of blood types, perform independent tests under 
order of court, the results of which may be offered in 
evidence The number and qualifications of such ex 
perts shall be determined by the court 1965 
78-45a-9. Compensa t ion of exper t witnesses. 
The compensation of each expert witness appointed 
by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable amount It 
shall be paid as the court shall o tder The court may 
order that it be paid by the parties in such propor 
tions and at such times as it shall prescribe The fee 
of an expert witness called by a party but not ap 
pointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling 
him but shall not be taxed as costs in the action 1965 
78-45a-10. Effect of test resul ts . 
If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, 
as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are 
that the alleged father is not the father of the child, 
the question of paternity shall be resolved accord-
ingly If the experts disagree in their findings or con-
clusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the 
evidence If the experts conclude that the blood tests 
show the possibility of the alleged father's paternity, 
admission of this evidence is within the discretion of 
the court, depending upon the mfrequency of the 
blood type 1965 
78-45a-ll. J u d g m e n t . 
Judgments under this act may be for periodic pay-
ments which may vary in amount The court may 
order payments to be made to the mother or to some 
person, corporation, or agency designated to adminis-
ter them under the supervision of the cou rt 1965 
78-45a-12. Securi ty. 
The court may require the alleged father to give 
bond or other security for the payment of the judg-
ment 1965 
78-45a-13. Set t lement agreements . 
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father 
is binding only when approved by the court 1965 
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TITLE I. APPLICABILITY O F RULES. 
Rule 1. Scope of ru les . 
(a) Applicabili ty of ru les . These rules govern the 
procedure before the Utah Court of Appeals in all 
cases. When these rules provide for a motion or appli-
cation to be made in a district, juvenile, or circuit 
court or an administrative agency, commission, or 
board, the procedure for making such motion or appli-
cation shall be governed by the practice of the dis-
trict, juvenile, or circuit court or the administrative 
agency, commission, or board. 
(b) Applicability of ru les to review of juveni le 
or circuit court p roceed ings . Whenever in these 
rules reference is made to practice and procedure in 
appeals or proceedings from an order or judgment of a 
district court, said rules shall have equal application, 
force, and effect with regard to practice and procedure 
in appeals from orders or judgments from a juvenile 
or circuit court. 
(c) P r o c e d u r e es tab l i shed by s ta tu te . If a proce-
dure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or 
review of an order of an administrative agency, com-
mission, or board or an officer of the state which is 
inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the stat-
ute shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall 
apply as to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jur i sd ic t ion . These rules 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Appeals as established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals and abbreviated R. 
Utah Ct. App. 
Rule 2. Suspension of ru les . 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the Court of 
Appeals, on its own motion or for extraordinary cause 
shown, may, except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 
4(e), and 5(a), suspend the requirements or provisions 
of any of these rules in a particular case and may 
order proceedings in that case in accordance with its 
direction. 
TITLE II. A P P E A L S FROM J U D G M E N T S 
AND O R D E R S . 
Rule 3. Appeal a s of r ight : H o w t a k e n . 
(a) Filing appea l from final o r d e r s a n d judg-
ments . As defined and provided by law, an appeal 
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of 
a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the 
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of 
an appellant to take any step other than the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity 
of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as 
the Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions 
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney 
fees. 
(b) J o i n t or consol idated appea l s . If two or more 
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or an 
order and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or 
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate 
timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals may 
thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal 
with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals on its 
530 
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own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of 
the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Des ignat ion of pa r t i e s . The party taking the 
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the ad-
verse party as the respondent. The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of 
the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the 
Court of Appeals. In original proceedings in the Court 
of Appeals, the party making the original application 
shall be known as the plaintiff and any other party as 
the defendant. 
(d) Con ten t of not ice of appea l . The notice of ap-
peal shall specify the party or parties taking the ap-
peal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from 
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate that 
the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals. 
(e) Service of not ice of appea l . The party taking 
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of 
appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judg-
ment or order or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, to the party at the last known address of the 
party. 
(0 Fi l ing a n d docke t ing fees in civil appea l s . 
At the time of filing any separate or joint notice of 
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal 
shall pay to the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken such filing fees as are established by 
law and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the 
Court of Appeals. The clerk of the court from which 
the appeal is taken shall not accept a notice of appeal 
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docket ing of appea l . Upon the filing of the 
notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken 
shall forthwith transmit one copy of the notice of ap-
peal, showing the date of its filing, together with the 
docketing fee, to the clerk of the Court of Appeals. 
Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and 
the docketing fee, the clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An 
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the 
action in the court from which the appeal is taken, 
with the appellant identified as such, but if such title 
does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
Rule 4. Appea l a s of r ight : When t aken . 
(a) Appea l from final j u d g m e n t a n d o rde r . In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit 
court to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
court from which the appeal is taken within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order ap-
pealed from. 
(b) Mot ions pos t j u d g m e n t o r o rde r . If a timely 
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
filed by any party in an action in which the Court of 
Appeals would have the power of direct review (1) for 
judgment under Rule 50(b), (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or 
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if 
the motion is granted, (3) under Rule 59 to alter or 
amend the judgment, or (4) under Rule 59 for a new 
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a 
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure is filed by any party under Rule 24 for a new 
trial or under Rule 26 for an order after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, t 
t ime for appeal for all parties shall run from t 
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
denying any such motion under Rule 26. A notice 
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the afcx. 
motions shall have no effect. A new notice of app< 
must be filed within the prescribed time measui 
from the entry of the order of the district court, ju> 
nile court, or circuit court disposing of the motion 
provided above. 
(c) Fil ing p r io r to en t ry of j u d g m e n t o r ord< 
Except as provided in Paragraph (b) of this rule-
notice of appeal filed after the announcement o» 
decision, a judgment, or an order but before the em 
of the judgment or order of the district court, juven 
court, or circuit court shall be treated as filed a) 
such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Addi t iona l o r c ross-appeal . If a timely nol 
of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may I 
a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
which the first notice of appeal was filed or within t 
time otherwise prescribed by Paragraph (a) of tt 
rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Ex tens ion of t ime to appea l . The court fr< 
which the appeal is taken, upon a showing of exc 
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time 
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not la 
than 30 days after the expiration of the time \> 
scribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion 
extend time that is filed before expiration of the \> 
scribed time may be heard ex parte unless the cm 
from which the appeal is taken requires otherwi 
Notice of any such motion that is filed after the e> 
ration of the prescribed time shall be given to i 
other parties in accordance with the rules of pracl 
of the court from which the appeal is taken. No ext> 
sion shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed tirm 
10 days from the date of entry of the order grand 
the motion, whichever occurs later. 
Rule 4A. Trans fe r of case from S u p r e m e Coi 
to Cour t of Appea l s . 
(a) Discre t ion of S u p r e m e Cour t to t ransfer , 
any time before a case is set for oral argument bef 
the Supreme Court, that court may transfer to i 
Court of Appeals any case except those cases witi 
the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. Such 
der of transfer shall be issued without opinion, wi 
ten or oral, as to the merits of the appeal or the t-
sons for the transfer. 
(b) Notice of o r d e r of t ransfer . Upon entry of i 
order of transfer by the clerk of the Supreme Cou 
that clerk shall immediately transmit the original 
the order to the clerk of the Court of Appeals and g. 
notice of entry by mail to each party to the proce. 
ing. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall mak« 
note in the docket of that court of the service by m« 
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall also notify t 
clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken 
the order of transfer and shall attach a copy of t 
order. 
(c) Rece ip t of o r d e r of t ransfer by Cour t of A 
peals . Upon receipt of the original order of trans, 
from the clerk of the Supreme Court, the clerk of t 
Court of Appeals shall enter the appeal upon i 
Court of Appeals docket. Notice that the appeal 1 
been docketed in the Court of Appeals shall the 
upon be immediately given by the clerk of the Co> 
of Appeals to each party to the proceeding in i 
same manner as is prescribed by Rule 39(c) of th. 
rules. • r . . u < 
